Legal Considerations on the Regulation of Use and Carriage of Heavy Fuel Oil in the Arctic Ocean by Deligiannis-Virvos, Konstantinos
 
 
Faculty of Law 
Legal Considerations on the Regulation of Use and Carriage of Heavy Fuel Oil in the Arctic 
Ocean 
Konstantinos Deligiannis-Virvos 









Table of Contents 
Part I: Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1. The Need to Regulate Heavy Fuel Oil Use and Carriage in the Arctic ............................. 1 
2. Objectives and Research Questions ................................................................................... 3 
3. Delimitation of Scope ......................................................................................................... 4 
4. Methodology and Sources .................................................................................................. 5 
5. Case Studies of Iceland and Norway .................................................................................. 5 
Part II: The International Framework applicable on the Regulation of HFO Use and Carriage 8 
1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ..................................................... 8 
2. The International Maritime Organization Regime ........................................................... 10 
2.2. The Polar Code .......................................................................................................... 12 
2.2. The Sulphur Oxides Regulation ................................................................................ 15 
2.3. Current IMO negotiation on the proposed ban of HFO use and carriage in the Arctic 
Ocean ................................................................................................................................ 17 
3. Cooperation within the Arctic Council ............................................................................ 20 
Part III: Unilateral Opportunities for the Regulation of HFO Use and Carriage in accordance 
with the State Jurisdiction conferred to by LOSC.................................................................... 22 
1. Flag State Jurisdiction ................................................................................................... 22 
2. Coastal State Jurisdiction ................................................................................................. 24 
2.1 Coastal State Jurisdiction in the Territorial Sea ......................................................... 24 
2.2 Coastal State Jurisdiction in the Exclusive Economic Zone ...................................... 32 
2.3 Coastal State Jurisdiction by virtue of Article 234 LOSC ......................................... 34 
3. Port State Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................... 39 
Part IV: Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 46 









List of Abbreviations 
 
AMSA    Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
Art. / Arts.   Article / Articles 
ASTM    American Society for Testing and Materials International 
CDEM    Construction, Design, Equipment and Manning 
ECA    Emission Control Area 
EGCS    Exhaust Gas Cleaning System 
EEZ    Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU    European Union 
GAIRS   Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards 
HFO    Heavy Fuel Oil 
IMO    International Maritime Organization 
ISO    International Organization for Standardization 
kg/m3    Kilogram per Cubic Meter 
LNG    Liquified Natural Gas 
LOSC    Law of the Sea Convention 
m/m    Mass by Mass 
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships 
MDO    Marine Diesel Oil 
MEPC    Marine Environment Protection Committee  
MGO    Marine Gas Oil 
n.m.     Nautical Mile(s) 
p. / pp.    page / pages 
PAME    Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group 
para. / paras.   Paragraph / paragraphs 
PPR    Pollution Prevention and Response Sub-Committee 
SOLAS   International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
VCLT    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties    







Page 1 of 59 
Part I: Introduction 
1. The Need to Regulate Heavy Fuel Oil Use and Carriage in the Arctic 
It is a well-known fact that the Arctic environment is particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change. In addition to rising temperatures caused by global warming that 
lead to ice-melting, the Arctic is vulnerable to “feedback loops” arising out of the delicate 
balance between frozen and liquid water.1 The highly reflective sea-ice that melts is turned 
into heat-absorbing open ocean waters, that lead to further rise in temperature.2 Rising 
temperatures also result in the release of methane, a greenhouse gas, from permafrost regions 
and coastal sediments into the atmosphere.3 
However, that very same rise in temperature results in the opening of previously ice-
covered navigational routes, a fact that did not remain unnoticed by States and the maritime 
industry. The Arctic Ocean faces a steady boost to navigation that facilitates transfer of goods, 
mineral resources and people.4 
A significant number of vessels that are currently navigating in or through Arctic 
waters use or carry heavy fuel oil (HFO). HFO is a general term used to describe a number of 
inexpensive but highly pollutant fuels. Specifically, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)5 Annex I, Chapter 9 Regulation 43 defines 
HFO as “1) crude oils having a density at 15℃ higher than 900 kg/m3; 2) oils, other than 
crude oils, having a density at 15℃ higher than 900 kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity at 50℃ 
higher than 180 mm2/s; or 3) bitumen, tar and their emulsions”.6 HFO under this definition 
includes residual marine fuel or mixtures containing mainly residual fuel and some distillate 
fuel.7 These kinds of fuels may be also called by different names, such as “heavy diesel oil”, 
“residual fuel”, “bunker”, or just “fuel oil”, or other.8 However, different definitions exist and 
may be based on different characteristics, such is the content of specific substances found in 
the fuel.  
 
1 Byers M., International Law and the Arctic, Cambridge University Press (2013), p. 2.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Macko S., “Changes in the Arctic Environment”, in Nordquist M., Heidar T. and Norton Moore J. Changes in 
the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2010) p. 110-111. 
4 Deggim H., “The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)”, in Hildebrand L. et al. 
(eds.) Sustainable Shipping in a Changing Arctic, Springer (2018) p. 16. 
5 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978 
[MARPOL] (signed 17 February 1978, entered into force 2 October 1983), 1340 UNTS 61 and 1341 UNTS 3. 
6 MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43. 
7 PAME, “Heavy Fuel in the Arctic (Phase I)”, Report No./DNV Reg No.: 2011-0053/ 12RJ7IW-4 Rev 00, 18 
January 2011, available at <https://www.pame.is/document-library/shipping-documents/heavy-fuel-oil-
documents>, last accessed 14 September 2020, p. 5.  
8 Ibid.  
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HFO poses several serious threats to the vulnerable Arctic marine environment. As is 
the case with most diesel fuel oils, HFO produces noxious airborne emissions such as sulphur 
oxides (SOx) and nitrous oxides (NOx).
9 Especially sulphur oxides are known to be harmful to 
human health, causing respiratory symptoms, lung disease and asthma.10 They also lead to 
acid rain, and contribute to the acidification of the oceans.11 
Additionally, HFO is hard to degrade and long lasting and, consequently, difficult to 
clean after an oil spill.12 A possible HFO spill would have an adverse impact on the health 
and food security of vulnerable Arctic communities.13 
It also produces ozone-depleting substances and greenhouse gases such as carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that contribute to the greenhouse effect and climate 
change.14 Finally, and importantly for the Arctic, HFO emits more black carbon, a black 
material formed through the incomplete combustion of fuel oil or coal.15 Black carbon is 
absorbed by snow and ice present in the Arctic Ocean, thus contributing to the feedback loops 
described before.16 It also has detrimental effects on human health that can affect the Arctic 
coastal communities.17 
Considerate of the dangers posed by the use of HFO, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has taken steps in order to regulate its use and carriage in the Arctic 
Ocean. The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)18 includes a 
recommendation for ships to not use HFO when sailing in the Arctic, while MARPOL Annex 
VI, Chapter 3, Regulation 14 (Sulphur Oxides Regulation)19 has set a meticulous regime in 
order to decrease the content of sulphur found in any fuel, including high-sulphur HFO, 
worldwide. Furthermore, IMO is currently considering a ban to the use and carriage of it in 
the Arctic Ocean. The work to formulate this new regulation is currently undertaken by 
IMO’s Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) and its sub-committee on 
 
9 Sun Z. “International Regulation of heavy fuel oil use by vessels in Arctic waters”, 34 Marine and Coastal Law 
513 (2019), p. 516.  
10 Fanø J. J., Enforcing International Maritime Legislation on Air Pollution through UNCLOS, Hart Publishing 
(2019), p. 3. 
11 IMO, Media Center, “Sulphur 2020 – cutting Sulphur oxide emissions”, available at 
<http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Sulphur-2020.aspx>, last accessed 14 September 2020. 
12 Sun, supra n. 9, p. 517. 
13 Ibid. p. 518. 
14 Ibid. p. 516. 
15 Ibid. p. 517. 
16 Boone L., “Development of an Environmental Chapter in the Polar Code: Introducing a New Player – Black 
Carbon”, 4 Yearbook of Polar Law 541 (2012), p. 547 
17 Ibid., p. 550.  
18 IMO Doc. MSC 385(94) - MEPC 68/21/Add.1, Annex 10, “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters” [Polar Code]. 
19 MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 3, Reg. 14.  
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Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR). A draft amendment was produced by the PPR on 
13 December 2019 and was accepted to be submitted in the MPEC for further consideration.20 
However, this ban will not be enforced until at least 2024 and for some vessels until 2029,21 
while it is not sure whether this new ban will adequately address the dangers posed by the use 
and carriage of HFO in the Arctic.22  
2. Objectives and Research Questions 
 This Thesis aims to analyze the recent efforts that take place in order to regulate the 
use and carriage of HFO by vessels navigating in or through the Arctic Ocean. It first 
examines the legal regime that can lead or has led to a multilateral regulation of HFO use and 
carriage. Secondly, it examines the legal bases for unilateral regulation and presents the 
examples of Norway and Iceland that have both adopted specific national rules for the use and 
carriage of HFO in waters under their jurisdiction.  
 In doing so, the Thesis attempts to answer the following research questions: 
• What multilateral legal bases can Arctic States use in order to regulate the use and 
carriage of HFO? 
• What is the scope and limits of State jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce legislation 
on HFO use and carriage in the Arctic Ocean?  
o Specifically, what are the limits for States that are willing to go beyond the 
generally accepted international rules and standards that are today in place?  
• Is it lawful for Arctic coastal States to unilaterally adopt and enforce regulations on 
the use and carriage of HFO in the waters under their jurisdiction? 
o Specifically, are the regulations adopted by Iceland and Norway in accordance 
with international law? 
• What are the legal advantages and constraints that stem from multilateral and 
unilateral action for the regulation of HFO use and carriage in the Arctic Ocean?  
  
 
20 IMO Sub-committee on Pollution, Prevention and Response, 7th Session, Agenda item 14, “Draft language for 
a ban of use and carriage of heavy fuel oil as fuel by ships in Arctic waters”, (13 December 2019). 
21 IMO, Media Center, Sub-committee on Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR), 17-21 February 2020, 
available at <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/PPR/Pages/PPR-7th-Session.aspx>, last 
accessed 14 September 2020. 
22 For a detailed discussion of the proposed ban see Part II/2.3 of this Thesis.  
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3. Delimitation of Scope 
 This Thesis focuses on the regulation of HFO use and carriage in the Arctic Ocean. 
Thus, the main applicable international rules that are to be discussed are the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)23 and MARPOL. In the context of MARPOL, the 
Thesis will discuss Annexes I and VI, including the related regulations on sulphur and the 
Polar Code. International Conventions that regulate other facets of international shipping that 
could have an incidental impact on the use and carriage of HFO, especially in a possible case 
of oil spill (such as the Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation Convention or 
the 1969 Civil Liability Convention), albeit important, are not discussed since they are not 
mainly concerned with the regulation of types of fuels such as HFO. 
 A number of Arctic Council documents will be discussed since they provide technical 
considerations that Arctic States may take into account when regulating HFO use and 
carriage, albeit these documents are not legally binding. 
National laws and regulations of the Arctic coastal States will be discussed as far as 
they are related to the objectives of the Thesis. Especially the legislation of Iceland and 
Norway will be comprehensively discussed since these two States have taken measures to 
regulate HFO use and carriage.   
The Thesis does not discuss the regulation of warships and government ships operated 
for non-commercial purposes.24 
The Thesis will mainly use the technical definition of “Arctic Waters” that is provided 
for in MARPOL and the Polar Code,25 but will also include the waters under Icelandic 
jurisdiction due to the importance of Iceland as an actor in the region and the fact that it has 
taken action to regulate HFO use and carriage. 
  
 
23 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention [LOSC] (signed 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994), 1833 UNTS 3. 
24 Warships and government ships are however expected to comply voluntarily with the laws and regulations of 
the coastal States. See McDorman T., “Sovereign immune Vessels: Immunities, Responsibilities and 
Exceptions”, in Ringbom H., (ed.), Jurisdiction over Ships: Post-UNCLOS Developments in the Law of the Sea, 
Brill (2015), pp. 95-96.  
25 MARPOL 73/78 Annex I, Reg. 1.11.7 and 46.2, Annex II, Reg. 13.8.1 and 21.2, Annex IV, Reg. 17.2 and 
17.3, and Annex V, Reg. 1.14.7 and 13.2. 
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4. Methodology and Sources 
Regarding the methodology, the Thesis utilizes mainly the doctrinal methodology in 
order to discuss the different jurisdictional bases on which a regulation of HFO use and 
carriage in the Arctic Ocean can be based. Specifically, the Thesis will examine the 
international legal framework that is today in place and can facilitate the regulation of HFO 
use and carriage in the Arctic Ocean. It will also analyze the jurisdiction of flag States, coastal 
States and port States, and the different ways a State may regulate HFO use and carriage, 
depending on its role.  
In this vein, the Thesis also provides case studies of the State practices of Iceland and 
Norway on the regulation of HFO use and carriage. Importantly, these case studies are not the 
main focus of the Thesis. In order for the Thesis to concretize its finding, it departs from the 
existing examples of Iceland and Norway, but it also includes several hypotheses to cover all 
the issues that arise in relation with HFO use and carriage. The case studies are, thus, used as 
a starting point to discuss the applicable rules that may be utilized in the regulation of HFO 
use and carriage.   
Given the objective of the Thesis the relevant sources that are to be utilized are 
stipulated in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.26 Especially 
regarding the interpretation of the relevant treaties, the Thesis applies the rules of 
interpretation that are set out in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).27  
5. Case Studies of Iceland and Norway  
To this date, only Iceland and Norway have taken unilateral measures targeting 
specifically the use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic. These national regulations raise 
considerations on their legality and the limits of the States’ jurisdiction on this matter, 
especially on whether they are, and can, go beyond the international legal framework that is 
today in place. Moreover, the respective national regulations differ significantly in the way 
they regulate the use and carriage of HFO.  
The Ilulissat Declaration that was issued by Norway, Denmark, Russia, Canada and 
the US in 2008 excluded Iceland (along with Finland and Sweden) from the, self-proclaimed, 
 
26 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Annex to the UN Charter (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 
25 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI. 
27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT] (signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 
1155 UNTS 331. 
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Arctic Coastal States.28 However, Iceland, Finland, Sweden and the Arctic Council’s 
permanent participants heavily contested this declaration. Iceland’s strategy is focused on the 
Arctic and its actions are significant in the process of regional decision making.29 the 
Icelandic waters are a main navigational route where the highest concentration of maritime 
traffic is found, along with the waters off Norway, the Barents Sea, the southwest coast of 
Greenland and the Bering Sea.30 This fact, along with Iceland’s established will to protect and 
preserve the marine environment under its jurisdiction,31 explains how it has decided to adopt 
a stringent legislation on the regulation of HFO and makes the examination of its State 
practice paramount for the issues at hand. 
In December 2019, Iceland adopted the Regulation 1084/201932 which amended the 
Regulation 124/2015 on the Sulphur Content of specific liquid Fuels.33 This recent 
amendment aims to tighten fuel requirements, specifically the content of sulphur, which 
effectively ban the use of HFO in the territorial sea of Iceland. The regulation is intended to 
promote improved air quality in harbours and coastal areas and conforms with the 
government’s coalition agreement and climate action plan.34 
Norway has introduced a ban on use and carriage of HFO only in the territorial sea of 
Svalbard Archipelago and in the protected areas it has established around it. The ban is based 
on the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act35 which was amended to provide a legal basis 
for it.36 In accordance with Art. 82 (a) of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act the 
Ministry for the Climate and the Environment “may lay down regulations on requirements for 
fuel quality for ships calling at Svalbard's territorial waters.” Based on this provision, Arts. 4 
 
28 Henriksen T. “Norway, Denmark (in respect of Greenland) and Iceland”, in Beckman R. et al. (eds.) 
Governance of Arctic Shipping, Brill Nijhoff (2017), p. 256. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. p. 249.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Iceland, Regulation no. 1084/2019 on 3rd Amendment to Regulation no. 124/2015 on the sulfur content of 
specific liquid fuels (Reglugerð um (3.) breytingu á reglugerð nr. 124/2015 um brennisteinsinnihald í tilteknu 
fljótandi eldsneyti) [English translation provided by the author], available at 
<https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/eftir-raduneytum/umhverfis--og-audlindaraduneyti/nr/21722>, last 
accessed 14 September 2020. 
33 Iceland, Regulation no. 124/2015 on the sulfur content of specific liquid fuels (Reglugerð um 
brennisteinsinnihald í tilteknu fljótandi eldsneyti) [English translation provided by the author], available at 
<https://www.reglugerd.is/reglugerdir/allar/nr/124-2015>, last accessed 14 September 2020. 
34 Iceland, Press Release, “Regulation banning the use of heavy fuel oil in the territorial sea of Iceland” (6 
December 2019), available at <https://www.government.is/diplomatic-missions/embassy-
article/2019/12/06/Regulation-banning-the-use-of-heavy-fuel-oil-in-the-territorial-sea-of-Iceland/>, last accessed 
14 September 2020. 
35 Svalbard Environmental Protection Act of 15 June 2001 (Lov om miljøvern på Svalbard (svalbardmiljøloven)) 
[English translation provided by the author], available at <https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2001-06-15-79>, 
last accessed 14 September 2020. 
36 Henriksen, supra n. 28, p. 271.  
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and 16 of the Regulations on the National Parks of Svalbard37 have been amended as to ban 
the use and carriage of “fuel other than the quality DMA in accordance with ISO 8217 Fuel 
Standard.” 
 As it was already noted, these two case studies are used to analyze and evaluate the 
different ways HFO use and carriage may be regulated by the Arctic States.   
 
37 Regulations on the national parks Sør-Spitsbergen, Forlandet and Nordvest-Spitsbergen, on the nature reserves 
Nordaust-Svalbard and Søraust-Svalbard, and on the nature reserves for birds on Svalbard of 1 May 2014 
(Forskrift om nasjonalparkene Sør-Spitsbergen, Forlandet og Nordvest-Spitsbergen, om naturreservatene 
Nordaust-Svalbard og Søraust-Svalbard, og om naturreservatene for fugl på Svalbard) [English translation 
provided by the author], available at <https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2014-04-04-377>, last accessed 
14 September 2020. 
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Part II: The International Framework applicable on the Regulation of HFO Use and 
Carriage 
This Part examines the international legal framework that is applicable in the 
regulation of HFO use and carriage. It begins with a presentation of the general regime that is 
set out by LOSC regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the 
mechanisms that LOSC utilizes towards that goal. Secondly, it examines the regime set out by 
IMO, specifically the Polar Code and the Sulphur Oxides Regulation. It also provides for a 
discussion of the negotiations that are currently taking place within IMO in order to introduce 
a ban on HFO use and carriage in the Arctic. Finally, it makes a brief analysis of the work of 
the Arctic Council on the matter of HFO use and carriage as a regional actor in the Arctic. 
The international community has long recognized that the environmental dangers 
posed by international shipping, including but not limited to the effects of HFO on the marine 
environment, warrant the adoption of a specific international regime tackling these issues 
necessary.38 Hence, States have ventured to create international rules to protect and preserve 
the marine environment and mitigate these threats. This is also in accordance with the States’ 
duty to cooperate, a fundamental principle in the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment set out both in customary and treaty-based international law. 39  
1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
LOSC is the principal international convention that covers nearly all matters of 
international law of the sea, including the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment and matters of navigation. The applicability of LOSC in the Arctic is today 
unquestionable. Both the Preamble to the LOSC, as well as the provision of Art. 234, which 
regulates coastal State jurisdiction on ice-covered areas, confirm this. Furthermore, the Arctic 
coastal States have acknowledged this fact in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration.40 
 LOSC does not contain any specific provisions on the regulation of fuel use by 
vessels. As a result, there is a need to base such regulations on the general framework 
provided for by the LOSC provisions. Primarily, LOSC follows a “zonal approach” that 
 
38 Harrison J., Saving the Oceans through Law: The International Legal Framework for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment, Oxford University Press (2017), p. 114 
39 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNDoc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l.-6 (1992), Principle 27; 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), UN 
Doc.A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1. – 6, 15, 17 (1972), Principle 24; Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-
Regional Fisheries Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015, ITLOS Rep. 2015, p. 4, para. 140; 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana / Côte d’Ivoire), Provisional Measures, 
Order of 25 April 2015, ITLOS Rep 2015, p. 146, para. 73. 
40 Ilulissat Declaration (adopted 28 May 2008), 48 ILM 382 (2009). 
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divides the ocean into a number of jurisdictional zones, which include the internal waters, 
territorial seas, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), archipelagic waters, 
the continental shelf, the high seas and the Area.41 Simultaneously, it allocates jurisdiction in 
accordance with the functions of the State in the maritime context, differentiating between the 
function of a State as a coastal State, a flag State or a port State.42  
The general provisions contained in Part XII LOSC regarding the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment are an exception to this allocation of functional 
jurisdiction, since they are applicable to all States, irrespective of whether they act as flag, 
coastal or port States.43 The main general provisions with regards to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment are Arts. 192 and 194 LOSC. Art. 192 sets out a 
general obligation of due diligence upon all States to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, without making any distinction between marine spaces under and beyond 
national jurisdiction.44 Art. 194 further informs the content of Art. 192, stipulating in more 
detail the nature of the measures that States are to take in order to fulfill their general 
obligation. These provisions focus mainly on unilateral acts by the States, except for Art. 194 
para. 1, according to which States are under the obligation to “take, individually or jointly as 
appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment from any source […]”. The more specific 
provisions of Part XII, however, impose obligations and duties upon States based on their 
functional jurisdiction as coastal, flag or port States.  
The general LOSC provisions, irrespective of whether they incorporate an allocation 
of functional jurisdiction upon States, are framed in a way that does not wish to regulate 
detailed issues. LOSC is characterized as a framework Convention which does not regulate 
activities, rights and responsibilities in a detailed manner, but makes use of such general 
provisions.45 The main way it does so in the context of navigation and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment is by utilizing “rules of reference”, i.e. provisions that 
instead of regulating an activity, they instead reference a more detailed or technical rule. The 
common reference utilized by LOSC is to “generally accepted international rules and 
standards (GAIRS)” that are enacted by international organizations and the relevant 
 
41 Tanaka Y., The International Law of the Sea, Cambridge University Press (2012), p.  
42 Gavouneli M., Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff (2008), p. 33.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Tanaka, supra n. 41, p. 263; South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of 
China) Award of 12 July 2016 on the Merits, PCA Case Nº 2013–19, paras. 941 and 959.  
45 Koh T., “A Constitution for the Oceans”, in Nordquist M. (series ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume 1, Martinus Nijhoff, (1985), pp. 11-16. 
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industries.46 As Redgwell notes, the incorporation of references to GAIRS in LOSC is 
“inherently evolutionary in character, fostering a dynamic interpretation of the relevant LOSC 
provisions”.47 GAIRS, in this respect, concern both the prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction of States and are set as a mandatory minimum for flag States and a facultative 
maximum for coastal States, thus securing the primacy of such international rules over 
national legislation.48 
Consequently, the regulation of the use and carriage of specific fuels, such as HFO, in 
a specific geographical area, such as the Arctic, relies heavily on the general LOSC provisions 
and the reference to GAIRS or the competent international organization. The necessary 
technical provisions are laid down in the regulatory Conventions adopted by IMO, which 
provide for specific and detailed obligations for the contracting parties.49 It is accepted that 
the “competent international organization” in matters of shipping, such as the one discussed 
currently, is the IMO.50  
2. The International Maritime Organization Regime  
In order for IMO to fulfill its purpose it adopts two kinds of instruments: resolutions 
and recommendations adopted by its General Assembly or its committees and international 
treaties. 51 As a general rule, coastal State prescriptive jurisdiction cannot be more stringent 
than GAIRS. They establish a minimum standard for flag states and a maximum standard for 
coastal states. 52 The GAIRS produced by IMO are often technical and aimed directly at 
ships.53 However, due to the nature of the IMO Conventions, as well as the LOSC provisions 
that refer to GAIRS, they have to be implemented through the legislation of member-States, a 
fact that results in the harmonization of the legal framework.54 
The most important of these IMO treaties, in the context of the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment, is MARPOL, which deals with vessel-sourced 
 
46 See Redgwell C., “Mind the Gaps in the GAIRS: The Role of other Instruments in LOSC Regime Implementation in 
the offshore Energy Sector”, in Bankes N. and Trevisanut S. (eds.), Energy from the Sea, Brill Nijhoff (2011).  
47 Ibid. p. 45; See also Boyle A., “Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for 
Change” 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 563 (2005), p. 569.  
48 International Law Association (ILA), Final Report of the Committee on coastal State Jurisdiction relating to 
marine Pollution, London Conference (2000), pp. 31-32.  
49 Ringbom H., “The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law”, Martinus Nijhoff (2008), p. 20 
50 IMO Doc. LEG/MISC.8, “Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the 
International Maritime Organization”, 30 January 2014, p. 7. 
51 Sun Z. and Beckman R., “The Development of the Polar Code and Challenges to its Implementation”, in Zou 
K. (ed.) Global Commons and the Law of the Sea, Brill Nijhoff (2018), p. 308. 
52 Boone L., “International Regulation of Polar Shipping”, in Molenaar E. et al (eds.) The Law of the Sea and the 
Polar Regions, Martinus Nijhoff (2013), p. 195. 
53 Harrison, supra n. 38, p. 117. 
54 Ibid. 
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pollution.55 It places limitations on ships discharging oil and noxious substances at sea, 
regulates garbage and sewage from ships, and ship-sourced air pollution. As of today, 159 
States have ratified it and all Arctic coastal States are parties to it.56 MARPOL Annexes I, II 
are compulsory upon all State-parties to MARPOL, while Annexes III, IV, V and VI are 
optional and their ratification status differs.57 
In the context of HFO regulation, MARPOL Annex I and Annex VI are of 
importance. MARPOL Annex I deals with oil pollution from vessels and is principally aimed 
at tankers carrying oil as cargo, albeit it covers pollution from bunker oil as well.58 It imposes, 
amongst others, a number of construction, design, equipment and manning (CDEM) 
requirements on vessels, the most important of which is the prohibition of single-hull oil 
tankers.59 Importantly, the definition of HFO provided for is included in MARPOL Annex I 
Reg. 43 that was adopted by MEPC in March 2010. It prohibits the carriage of HFO both in 
bulk as cargo or as fuel in the waters surrounding Antarctica.60 MARPOL Annex I Reg. 43 
entered into force on 1 August 2011 and was further amended in 2014 in order to ban the use 
of HFO as ballast in the same area.61 
MARPOL Annex VI on the other hand regulates air pollution from ships.62 To date, it 
is ratified by 98 States representing 96,76% of world shipping by gross tonnage.63 It has 
introduced incremental standards for noxious substances and emissions such as Sulphur 
oxides and regulations on vessel energy efficiency.64 Additionally, MARPOL Annex VI 
allows for the establishment of Emissions Control Areas (ECAs) which are utilized as area-
based management tools that impose lower limits on the sulphur content of fuel that may be 
used in these areas.65 
Many of the MARPOL regulations are prospective in nature, i.e. they do not apply to 
existing and operational vessels but rather apply to vessels that are to be constructed on or 
after the day the regulation enters into force.66  
 
55 Tanaka, supra n. 41, pp. 276-277. 
56 IMO, Status of IMO Treaties, available at 
<http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>, last accessed 14 
September 2020. 
57 See Harrison, supra n. 38, pp. 121-124. 
58 Ibid. p. 121. 
59 Ibid. 
60 MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43.  
61 Deggim, supra n. 4, p. 33.  
62 Harrison, supra n. 38, p. 124.  
63 IMO, Status of IMO Treaties, supra n 56.  
64 Harrison, supra n. 38, p. 124 and p. 261-262. 
65 Ibid., p. 126.  
66 Ibid., p. 124. 
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MARPOL, like many other IMO Conventions, provides for a tacit acceptance 
procedure with regards to amendments. It contains provisions enabling the adoption of 
amendments to its annexes that make them not susceptible to lengthy amendment procedures. 
Thus it is adaptive and kept current with developments in science, technology and in the 
shipping industry.67  
According to Art. 16 MARPOL an amendment to an Annex shall be deemed to have 
been accepted at the end of a period of no less than ten months at the time of its adoption, 
unless within that period a certain number of objections from the Parties have been 
communicated to the IMO Secretariat. After that time, the amendment enters into force six 
months after its acceptance and is binding upon all the Parties, with the exception of the 
contracting States that objected to it.68 The Polar Code and the Sulphur Oxides Regulation 
that are to be discussed below are such examples of amendments that followed this procedure. 
Since they entered into force, they became applicable to every State-party to MARPOL and 
the relevant Annexes. Moreover, the current IMO negotiations on a ban of HFO use and 
carriage in the Arctic will utilize this method in order to amend MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 
9, Reg. 43 and the Polar Code. 
2.2. The Polar Code 
After lengthy negotiations and the adoption of a number of non-binding Guidelines for 
navigation in polar waters,69 IMO managed to adopt a binding instrument on the matter. The 
Maritime Safety Committee and the MEPC adopted the draft Polar Code in 2014 and 2015.70 
The Polar Code functions as an amendment to not only MARPOL, but also the International 
Convention for the Safety of Lives at Sea (SOLAS)71 and the International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).72 The 
mandatory Code became effective on 1 January 2017 with respect to MARPOL and SOLAS 
while the provisions related to the STCW became effective on 1 July 2018.73 
 
67 Sun and Beckman, supra n. 51, pp. 311-312. 
68 MARPOL, Art. 16. 
69 See IMO Doc. MSC/ Circ.1056– MEPC/ Circ.399, “Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered 
Waters” (2002) and IMO Doc. A26/Res.1024, “Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters” (2009).  
70 For a detailed presentation of the procedure of adopting the Polar Code see Roach J., “A Note to make the 
Polar Code Mandatory” in Lalonde S. and McDorman T. (eds.) International Law and Politics of the Arctic 
Ocean Brill Nijhoff (2015), pp. 128-135. 
71 International Convention for the Safety of Lives at Sea [SOLAS] (signed 1 November 1974, entered into force 
25 May 1980), 1184 UNTS 278. 
72 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers [STCW] 
(signed 7 July 1978, entered into force 28 April 1984), 1361 UNTS 2. 
73 Williams L., “An Ocean between Us: The Implications of Inconsistencies between the Navigational Laws of 
Coastal Arctic Council Nations and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for Arctic 
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The Polar Code has been developed “to supplement existing IMO instruments in order 
to increase the safety of ships’ operation and mitigate the impact on the people and 
environment in the remote, vulnerable and potentially harsh polar waters”.74 It applies to both 
Arctic waters and the waters surrounding Antarctica75 and it utilizes a risk-based approach in 
determining scope and to adopt a holistic approach in reducing identified risks.76 
The Polar Code is structured into an Introduction and two separate Parts regarding 
safety measures (Part I) and pollution prevention measures (Part II), which are in turn 
implemented in SOLAS and MARPOL.77 The Introduction contains mandatory provisions 
applicable to both parts.78 Both Parts contain mandatory provisions (Parts I-A and II-A) and 
“Additional Guidance” provisions (Parts I-B and II-B) which function as recommendations 
for ships navigating the waters covered by the Polar Code.79 Both Part I and Part II include 
CDEM requirements.  
 The Polar Code does not contain a provision similar to that of MARPOL Annex I, 
Chapter 9, Reg. 43 that bans the use and carriage of HFO in Antarctica. Instead, it includes 
only a recommendation in Part II-B that encourages ships to apply MARPOL Annex I, 
Chapter 9, Reg. 43 when operating in Arctic waters.80 
 The question that arises in that instant is whether this recommendation can be 
regarded as GAIRS in the context of the relevant LOSC provisions, such as Art. 21 para. 2 or 
Art. 211 LOSC. The mandatory provisions of the Polar Code are to be regarded as GAIRS in 
the context of Arctic navigation and in accordance with those provisions, even though the 
more specific provision of Art. 234 LOSC does not mention GAIRS.81 However, it is not 
clear whether a non-mandatory recommendation such as the one relevant to the HFO use in 
the Arctic waters can attain such status and be utilized by the Arctic States to regulate HFO 
use and carriage.  
 
Navigation”, 70 Vanderbilt Law Review 379 (2017), p. 392-393; IMO, Media Center, Shipping in Polar Waters, 
available at <http://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/polar/pages/default.aspx>, last accessed 14 
September 2020. 
74 Polar Code, Preamble (1). 
75 Polar Code, Preamble (6). 
76 Polar Code, Preamble (7). 
77 Roach J., “The Polar Code and its Adequacy”, in Beckman R. et al. (eds.) Governance of Arctic Shipping, 
Brill Nijhoff (2017), p. 146. 
78 Polar Code, Introduction, (4). 
79 Rothwell D., Arctic Ocean Shipping: Navigation, Security and Sovereignty in the North American Arctic, Brill 
(2018), p. 20. 
80 Ibid.; Polar Code, Part II-B, 1, 1.1.  
81 For the analysis of Art. 234 and its relevance on the subject matter see Part III/2.3 of this Thesis.  
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 For a rule to be regarded as GAIRS it does not have to have attained the status of a 
rule of customary international law, nor it should be binding upon all the States concerned.82 
This is understood by taking into consideration the object and purpose of the inclusion of such 
rules of reference in the LOSC provisions, in accordance with Art. 31 VCLT. According to 
the International Law Association (ILA) the inclusion of rules of reference ensures that 
“certain rules and standards which would not otherwise be legally binding would become so 
by means of this rule of reference”.83 If the GAIRS were to be restrictedly defined as rules of 
customary international law or as binding upon the concerned State parties, they would be 
applicable erga omnes or erga omnes partes and their inclusion in the LOSC provisions 
would be obsolete.84 ILA concludes that the important factor in order to determine whether a 
rule can be considered GAIRS and be used as a rule of reference appears to be the practice of 
States, irrespective of what form the rule might have been expressed.85 These forms may vary 
from binding treaties to non-binding documents, or “an agreement which at the time of 
adoption was rejected by a certain number of states but later on nevertheless became 
acceptable to all as reflected in state practice, a resolution of an international organization” et 
al.86 
 However, this rationale cannot lead to the conclusion that the HFO related 
recommendation included in the Polar Code can be regarded as binding upon the parties to the 
LOSC by virtue of its characterization as GAIRS. In this instance the GAIRS to be taken into 
account is the Polar Code as a whole, including the non-mandatory recommendation on HFO 
use and carriage. If the recommendation was to be regarded as binding on the LOSC State 
Parties by virtue of a rule of reference, it would defeat the object and purpose of the Polar 
Code, which intended for this provision to be non-mandatory. Of course, the recommendation 
remains relevant in the regulation of HFO use and carriage in the Arctic as part of the Polar 
Code, but no State could regard it as GAIRS upon which it would base national legislation in 
order to ban the use and carriage of HFO. 
Nevertheless, since the adoption of the Polar Code, IMO has taken some steps towards 
a more strict and comprehensive regulation of HFO, including but not limited to the Arctic 
Ocean. In connection to this work that is currently being undertaken by MEPC and the 
 
82 For a detailed discussion on this, see ILA, supra n. 48, pp. 33-38.  
83 Ibid., p. 37. 
84 Ibid., p. 37. For the opposite opinion see van Reenen, W., “Rules of Reference in the New Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, in Particular in Connection with the Pollution of the Sea by Oil from Tankers”, 12 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 3 (1981), pp. 11-12.  
85 ILA, idid. p. 37-38 
86 Ibid. p. 38. 
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competent sub-committees, MEPC on October 2016 decided that on 1st January 2020, a 
significant reduction in the sulphur content of the fuel oil used by ships sailing worldwide 
would be implemented.87 
2.2. The Sulphur Oxides Regulation 
IMO trying to reduce the harmful impacts of worldwide shipping decided to adopt a 
regulation that targets the emissions produced by regulating the content of sulphur within the 
fuel. It has adopted the MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 3, Regulation 14, (hereinafter: the 
Sulphur Oxides Regulation), which aims to significantly reduce the amount of sulphur oxide 
(SOx) emissions from ships using or carrying, amongst others, HFO.
88 The vast majority of 
HFO-type fuels have high concentration of sulphur which is detrimental for both the 
environment and human health.89 The Sulphur Oxides Regulation was first introduced in 1997 
and entered into force in 2005. When it first entered into force, it set the maximum sulphur 
content limit at 4,5% m/m at a global level, while simultaneously it set the limit at 1,5% m/m 
for sulphur ECAs.90 The regulation was further amended in 2008 and entered into force in 
2010. It reduced the worldwide sulphur cap to 3.5% m/m, effective from 1 January 2012 and 
the sulphur limits applicable in sulphur ECAs to 1.0% m/m, beginning on 1 July 2010 and 
further to 0.10% m/m, effective from 1 January 2015.91 The Sulphur Oxides Regulation 
further set the 1st January 2020 as the date when the Sulphur content of any fuel oil used on 
board shill shall not exceed the limit of 0,50% m/m.  
Specifically, SOx and particulate matter emission controls apply to all fuel oil, as 
defined in MARPOL Annex VI Reg. 2.9, and to combustion equipment and devices onboard, 
such as boilers and inert gas generators. As it is clear from the different limits set, the Sulphur 
Oxides Regulation differentiates between controls applicable in sulphur ECAs established to 
limit the emission of SOx and particulate matter and those applicable outside such areas. In 
 
87 Deggim, supra n. 4, p. 33.  
88 MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 3, Reg. 14; see also IMO, Media Center on Sulphur 2020, supra n. 11. 
89 Fanø J. J., “Enforcement of the 2020 Sulphur Limit for marine Fuels: Restrictions and Possibilities for Port 
States to impose Fines under UNCLOS”, 28 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental 
law 278 (2019), p. 278.  
90 Ringbom H., “Enforcement of the Sulphur in Fuel Requirements: Same, Same but Different”, Scandinavian 
Institute of Maritime Law Yearbook (2016), available at <https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/61600>, last 
accessed 14 September 2020, pp. 3-4; The sulphur ECAs are the Baltic Sea area, defined in MARPOL Annex I, 
the North Sea area, defined in MARPOL Annex V, the North American area, defined in Appendix VII of 
MARPOL Annex VI and the United States Caribbean Sea area, defined in Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex 
VI.  
91 Ringbom (2016), ibid. 
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these sulphur ECAs the limit is set to 0,10% m/m instead of 0,50% m/m which is the general 
limit outside these areas.  
In practice, the sulphur limit amounts to a requirement for ships to stop using HFO 
which may be low sulphur (0.50%-1.5%) or high sulphur (>1.5%).92 The set limit can be met 
either by using blended fuel oil that is low in sulphur content or different fuels such as 
liquefied natural gas or biofuels, which may contain low or zero sulphur.93 Importantly, 
vessels are able to limit the air pollutants by installing exhaust gas cleaning systems (EGCS), 
also known as “scrubbers”, that are designed to remove sulphur oxides from the ship’s engine 
and boiler exhaust gases. Flag States may accept this as an alternative means to meet the set 
requirements. Consequently, a ship equipped with an EGCS can still use HFO, since the SOx 
emissions will be reduced to a level equivalent to the required limit.94 However, several States 
have set regulations in place that significantly limit or prohibit the discharge of wash water 
from the use of open-loop scrubbers in the waters under their jurisdiction, thus limiting their 
applicability in those areas.95 
Along with these measures a “carriage ban” was introduced for the first time on 1st 
March 2020. The carriage of non-compliant fuel oil for combustion purposes for propulsion 
or operation on board a ship is prohibited, unless the ship has an EGCS installed. The carriage 
ban works as an additional measure with the aim of consistent implementation and 
compliance with the regulations. At the same time, this breakthrough provides for a means of 
effective enforcement by States, particularly port State control.96 As Fanø notes, violations of 
sulphur regulations are usually detected by drawing fuel samples from a ship’s fuel tank.97 
However, this method sometimes proves ineffective since large commercial vessels often 
have several fuel tanks on board, that they can switch between during a voyage, thus avoiding 
detection of violations.98 With the carriage ban now in force, the regulations on sulphur 
content are strengthened since a ship will not be able to carry tanks with fuel that has different 
sulphur content, unless it has installed an approved EGCS.99 However, the EGCS exception 
can also be viewed as an important drawback to the regulation. It is difficult to prove whether 
 
92 Ibid., p. 4.  
93 IMO, Media Center on Sulphur 2020, supra n. 11. 
94 Ibid.  
95 For an indicative list of States that have adopted such regulations see Damgaard J., “List of Jurisdictions 
restricting or banning Scrubber wash Water Discharges”, Britannia P&I , available at 
<https://britanniapandi.com/blog/2020/01/27/list-of-jurisdictions-restricting-or-banning-scrubber-wash-water-
discharges/>, last accessed 14 September 2020. 
96 IMO, Media Center on Sulphur 2020, supra n. 11. 
97 Fanø, supra n. 89, p. 280.  
98 Ibid. p. 281.  
99 Ibid. 
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the EGCS is used continuously or not during a vessel’s voyage. It also ensures that HFO will 
still be an option in the market for shipowners that opt for the installment of EGCS in their 
ships instead of transitioning to cleaner fuels. For the time being, the EGCS exception can at 
least be seen as a balancing act between the interests of the various parties in the dialogue 
surrounding the regulation of HFO use, while its long-term effects are to be determined in the 
future.  
2.3. Current IMO negotiation on the proposed ban of HFO use and carriage in the 
Arctic Ocean  
The dangers posed by the use of HFO specifically in the Arctic have not been ignored 
by the international community. IMO, taking into account the need for a more comprehensive 
legal regime on this matter, is currently considering a ban to the use and carriage of HFO 
specifically in the Arctic Ocean that will go beyond the prerequisites set by the Polar Code 
and the Sulphur Oxides Regulation. The ban will be introduced as an amendment in 
MARPOL Annex I and the Polar Code, following the tacit amendment procedure discussed 
before. As it was already noted, the work to formulate this new provision is currently 
undertaken by IMO’s MEPC and the PPR sub-committee. A draft document was submitted to 
the PPR by Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and the US on 13 December 2019100 and, along with agreed 
amendments, it will be submitted to the Marine Environment Protection Committee with a 
view to approval and circulation for future adoption.101 
 The PPR in its 6th session agreed that it will utilize the definition of HFO provided for 
in MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43.102 Moreover, the co-sponsors of the draft 
submitted that MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43 is to be amended as to replace the 
phrase “Antarctic area” with “Polar Waters”, in order to be applicable in the waters covered 
by the Polar Code.103 Amending MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43 would consolidate 
the proposed Arctic ban with the existing ban applicable in the waters around Antarctica with 
which “it shares various common definitions and a common purpose”.104 In addition, the co-
 
100 IMO, PPR, Draft Language on the HFO ban, supra n. 20.  
101 IMO, Media Center on the HFO ban, supra n. 21.  
102 IMO, PPR, Draft Language on the HFO ban, supra n. 20, para. 2.  
103 Ibid. para. 3. 
104 Ibid. para. 4. 
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sponsors recommend the Polar Code is also to be amended in order to conform to the 
proposed amendment of MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43.105  
The proposed amendment, albeit promising, has been reluctantly accepted by Canada, 
a major actor in the Arctic Ocean. Specifically, Canada has recently expressed its support for 
the ban but, at the same time, it has suggested a modification that would push the 
implementation date to 2024, and for some vessels to 2029.106 The proposed modification is 
accepted and thus the ban will be significantly delayed. Russia on the other hand, as another 
major actor that facilitates navigation in the Arctic through the Northern Sea Route, has not 
expressed its support for the proposed ban yet and has pointed out a number of important, 
mainly economic, considerations relating to it.107  
An important consideration posed by both countries is the effect of the proposed HFO 
ban on Arctic communities, including the communities of the indigenous peoples. Canada 
noted that the impact assessment it conducted concluded that “an HFO ban and the higher 
price of fuels to be used in the place of HFO, if unmitigated, could result in negative social 
and economic impacts on northern communities, including Indigenous and Inuit peoples who 
depend on shipping for basic supplies and natural resource developments for employment and 
economic prosperity”.108 
  Furthermore, according to the Russian impact assessment, the majority of indigenous 
communities are highly dependent on the shipment of goods by ships that use, amongst other 
HFO. A possible increase of shipping costs would “inevitably and dramatically” affect the 
economic condition of the native communities,109 and would have “an extremely negative 
impact on the fuel sector, production and distribution of heat and electricity, as well as on the 
mining industry and relevant enterprises”.110 
However, according to a document submitted by the environmental organizations 
FOEI, WWF and Pacific Environment to the PPR on 12 December 2019, indigenous peoples 
have expressed their support for an HFO ban and also their concerns on the discussion in the 
PPR on the basis that the ban should be implemented quicker and more effectively.111 It notes 
 
105 Ibid.  
106 IMO, Sub-committee on Pollution, Prevention and Response, 7th Session, “Canada's considerations and 
position on the ban on the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by ships operating in the Arctic at PPR 7”, 17 to 21 
February 2020.  
107 IMO, Sub-committee on Pollution, Prevention and Response, 7th Session, Agenda item 14, “Impact 
Assessment Report submitted by the Russian Federation”, 13 December 2019.  
108 IMO, PPR, Canada’s considerations, supra n. 106, p. 1.  
109 IMO, PPR, Russia’s Impact Assessment, supra n. 107, p. 33.  
110 Ibid. p. 29.  
111 IMO Sub-committee on Pollution, Prevention and Response, 7th Session, Agenda item 14, “Arctic Indigenous 
Support for the Ban of Heavy Fuel Oil in the Arctic”, 12 December 2019.  
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that several indigenous communities and organizations have called for a ban of HFO in the 
Arctic and have expressed support for Indigenous representation at IMO due to the threat of 
oil spills from vessels that navigate in the area.112 It is clear that the considerations on the 
impact of an HFO ban on the indigenous populations of the Arctic should be taken into 
account, whether they are concerned with the economic or the environmental impact on the 
communities. 
 According to the accepted draft document and its amendments, that were proposed 
mainly by Canada, the ban on the use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic will be introduced on 
and after 1 July 2024, in order to provide for a transition period to better understand and 
mitigate any negative impacts of the ban on Arctic communities and economies.113 However, 
a number of important exceptions and waivers have been included that will push the 
implementation of the new ban further in the future, or will serve as loopholes for some ships. 
First of all, vessels that already comply with MARPOL Annex I Reg. 12A or with the Polar 
Code Part II-A, Chapter 1 Reg. 1.2.1 would need to comply with the HFO ban on and after 1 
July 2029, and not 2024 as other vessels.114 Moreover, ships that are engaged in securing the 
safety of ships, or in search and rescue operations, and ships dedicated to oil spill 
preparedness and response would be exempted from the ban.115 Finally, a State party to 
MARPOL with a coastline bordering Arctic waters may temporarily waive the requirements 
for ships flying its flag while operating in waters subject to that State’s sovereignty or 
jurisdiction, up to 1 July 2029.116 
These exemptions and waivers, as well as the timeframe for the proposed ban, may 
significantly diminish its importance for the protection and preservation of the Arctic marine 
environment. However, it is not certain whether the States concerned would otherwise agree 
to a ban if those conditions were not accepted. For the time being, but also for the foreseeable 
future, it is safe to assume that a complete ban of HFO use and carriage in the Arctic will not 
be imposed by IMO, but it will include such exemptive provisions.  
  
 
112 Ibid. paras. 4 and 10 where these organizations and their representatives are listed.  
113 IMO, Media Center on the HFO ban, supra n. 21; IMO, PPR, Canada’s considerations, supra n. 106, p. 1 
114 IMO, PPR, Draft Language on the HFO ban, supra n. 20, para. 3.4.  
115 IMO, Media Center on the HFO ban, supra n. 21. 
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3. Cooperation within the Arctic Council 
Apart from the work that is done under the auspices of IMO, the Arctic States 
cooperate within the Arctic Council system. The Arctic Council is not an organization with an 
international legal personality different from the legal personality of its member States.117 It 
was established in 1996 as a high-level forum under the auspices of which a number of 
Arctic-related issues would be discussed.118 The function of the Arctic Council as an inter-
governmental forum established by a non-legally binding instrument, means that it does not 
have the competence to adopt legally binding instruments.119 Nevertheless, this does not 
diminish its importance of promoting cooperation between the Arctic States.120 Its member 
States can negotiate agreements under its auspices that may be materialized in international 
treaties. 
The Arctic Council’s working groups can compose reports and propose measures that 
the member States are encouraged to implement.121 In this vein, the working group on the 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) has produced an important document 
regarding merchant shipping.122 The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA)123 refers to 
the challenges that ships navigating the Arctic Ocean may encounter and the environmental 
issues the region is facing. It underlines that the Arctic coastal States should anticipate greater 
marine access and longer navigation seasons as a consequence of melting sea ice, even though 
that will not render marine activities less difficult or dangerous.124 
 Building upon AMSA, PAME agreed to carry out a project to identify the 
environmental risks related to the use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic. The project 
commenced in March 2010 and continued until 2016. The PAME project was divided in three 
phases: Phase I objectives were to (a) identify known risks associated with use or carriage of 
HFO within the Arctic marine transportation system, (b) consider potential risk mitigation 
 
117 Takei Y., “The Role of the Arctic Council from an International Law Perspective: Past, Present and Future”, 
6 The Yearbook of Polar Law 349 (2015), p. 354. 
118 Ibid., p. 350; see also Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, (19 September 1996), available 
at <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-
ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y>, last accessed 14 
September 2020. 
119 Molenaar E., “Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System within the Context of the Law of 
the Sea”, 27 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 553 (2012), p. 571. 
120 Takei, supra n. 117, p. 356. 
121 McDorman T., “The Safety of Navigation in the Arctic Ocean and the role of Coast Guards”, 2 Korean 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 27 (2014), p. 36.  
122 Molenaar (2012), supra n. 119, p. 593.  
123 PAME, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment of 2009 (AMSA), available at 
<www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf>, last accessed 14 September 
2020. 
124 Ibid., p. 4. 
 
Page 21 of 59 
strategies, (c) examine the current state of the marine transportation industry in the Arctic 
region and its reliance on HFO, including forecasting trends related to commercial shipping 
and trade expansion and the implementation of recent or anticipated standards and (d) 
summarize the status of international regulations regarding the use or carriage of HFOs by 
vessels.125 Phase I utilized data provided only by a satellite and for that reason it focused on a 
very short period of four months.126 Phase II utilized available data regarding a full year of 
ship traffic and had a greater scope of objectives.127 Phase III, which was divided in two parts, 
described the effect of HFO releases on the marine environment in the Arctic and “near 
Arctic”,128 as well as the possible hazards for engines and fuel systems using HFO in cold 
climates.129 A correlated report titled “Alternative Fuels in the Arctic” was also produced on 
27 February 2019 by PAME, WWF and Norway with the goal to assess alternative fuels and 
technologies for potential arctic use that could “significantly reduce emissions and impacts, as 
well as risk associated with the use and carriage of HFO.130 
As stated above, the Arctic Council cannot impose legal obligations on its member 
States. It also avoids producing documents that would be seen as GAIRS, except when the 
States cooperating within it choose to negotiate for a binding treaty.131 However the technical 
reports such as those produced by PAME can be utilized by the Arctic States when they set 
out their priorities and strategies regarding the issues that they wish to address. Especially 
concerning issues of navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, the Arctic Council has encouraged the establishment of active cooperation with 
IMO on the development of relevant measures to regulate shipping activities in Arctic 
waters.132  
 
125 PAME, Phase I, supra n. 7, p. 3.  
126 Ibid., p. 6.  
127 PAME, “Heavy Fuel in the Arctic (Phase II)” DNV Doc. No./Report No.: 2013-1542-16G8ZQC-5/1, 13 
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Near Arctic”, final version/corr., by USA, Finland, Russian Federation, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway and 
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Part III: Unilateral Opportunities for the Regulation of HFO Use and Carriage in 
accordance with the State Jurisdiction conferred to by LOSC 
This Part concerns itself with the unilateral regulation of HFO use and carriage and 
whether such regulations are in accordance with the jurisdiction conferred to States by LOSC. 
In this end, it examines the State practices of Iceland and Norway under the prism of their 
jurisdiction as flag States, coastal States and port States. Having these case-studies as a 
starting point, it provides for the applicable international rules that can be utilized by all the 
Arctic States that would wish to regulate HFO use and carriage. For this reason, it includes an 
analysis of Art. 234 LOSC, even though the State practice of Iceland and Norway does not 
make use of it. 
1. Flag State Jurisdiction 
Each State’s jurisdiction over ships that fly its flag is not in principle limited by 
international law, taking into account the minimum requirements set out by it, including those 
provided for in the LOSC.133  
Specifically, Arts. 94 para. 5 and 211 para. 2 LOSC require that ships shall comply 
with set GAIRS on maritime safety and environmental protection. As it was already shown, 
the MARPOL provisions described before (including the Polar Code and the Sulphur Oxides 
Regulation) are such GAIRS directed to ships flying the flags of MARPOL State parties. As a 
result, flag State jurisdiction is the principal vehicle through which such GAIRS are 
implemented.   
Art. 217 LOSC provides for detailed obligations for flag States that stipulate the way 
they are to enforce environmental regulations.134 According to this provision, flag States are 
obligated to effectively enforce GAIRS, including the Sulphur Oxides Regulation.  
Therefore, GAIRS are referenced by LOSC to constitute the minimum requirements a 
flag State may impose on its ships. As a result, flag States have to impose upon ships flying 
their flags the Sulphur Oxides Regulation. The recommendation not to use HFO in the Arctic 
is, as already noted, non-mandatory, but it is to be taken into account by vessels navigating 
the Arctic. Flag States are also free to go beyond these standards. Since HFO is not, at the 
moment, regulated as such by LOSC and IMO in respect to the Arctic Waters, flag States are 
 
133 Ringbom (2016), supra n. 90, p. 9 
134 Fanø, supra n. 89, p. 283. 
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under no obligation to put forth restrictions on its use and carriage. It is thus left in the coastal 
and port States’ devices to regulate its use and carriage in the waters under their jurisdiction. 
Finally, Art. 212 provides for the prescriptive jurisdiction of States to “prevent, reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere, applicable 
to the air space under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their flag or vessels or aircraft of 
their registry”. This legislation shall be prescribed “taking into account” GAIRS. In the same 
vein, Art. 222 on the enforcement jurisdiction of States with respect to pollution from or 
through the atmosphere makes reference to GAIRS. However, it must be noted that these two 
provisions are more concerned with the regulation of pollution caused by air traffic and are 
usually not seen as relevant for governing the extent of States’ jurisdiction with respect to 
MARPOL’s air emissions and fuel quality requirements, a fact also supported by their 
drafting history.135 Additionally, MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 11 para. 6 specifically ties 
the relevant MARPOL rules to the jurisdictional regime established by LOSC regarding 
vessel-sourced pollution rather than pollution from or through the atmosphere by providing 
for the mutatis mutandis application of Annex VI to the rules concerning the prevention, 
reduction or control of pollution of the marine environment from ships.136  
The Icelandic legislation is not clear on whether it is applicable on Icelandic vessels 
that navigate outside the maritime zones under the jurisdiction of it. Specifically, the 
legislation indicates that its applicability is based on the territorial jurisdiction enjoyed by 
Iceland and not its jurisdiction as a flag State.137 Similarly, the Norwegian legislation is 
applicable to all vessels, irrespective of the flag they fly, that enter the specified areas around 
Svalbard.138 These provisions indicate that the regulations are applicable to Icelandic and 
Norwegian ships and, as far as these vessels are concerned, they can go beyond the set 
GAIRS that are found in the Sulphur Oxides Regulation. They are also able to make the HFO 
recommendation included in the Polar Code mandatory to the ships flying their flags, but, to 
date, have not done so.  
Of course, not only the Arctic States can regulate HFO use and carriage in their 
capacity as flag States. The exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State can be utilized by every 
State whose ships travel in or through the Arctic. However, to date, no State has expressed 
such will to regulate HFO use and carriage in the Arctic. 
 
135 Nordquist M., Rosenne S. and Yankov A., (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, Martinus Nijhoff, (1985), Volume IV, pp. 208-213; Ringbom (2016), supra n. 90, p. 8; Fanø supra 
n. 89, p. 283.  
136 Ringbom (2016) ibid., p. 9.  
137 Iceland, Regulation n. 124/2015, supra n. 33, Art. 4.  
138 Norway, Regulation on Svalbard’s National Parks, Chapter 1 para. 4 and Chapter 2 para. 16.  
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2. Coastal State Jurisdiction  
2.1 Coastal State Jurisdiction in the Territorial Sea 
The territorial sea is the marine space under the sovereignty of the coastal State up to a 
limit not exceeding 12 nm measured from the baselines, including the seabed, its subsoil and 
the airspace over it. Coastal States may regulate activities and take enforcement actions in 
their territorial seas subject to the LOSC and other rules of international law.139 The 
sovereignty of the coastal State is, however, largely reconciled by the right of innocent 
passage enjoyed by foreign-flagged vessels, as stipulated in Arts. 17-26 LOSC. In order for 
the passage to be innocent it has to be continuous and expeditious140 and not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.141 Art. 19 para. 2 LOSC lists a number of 
instances when the passage shall not be considered innocent.  
Art. 21 LOSC sets out the capacity of the coastal State to exercise its prescriptive 
jurisdiction on foreign-flagged vessels. According to lit. (f) of this provision, the coastal State 
may adopt laws and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in 
respect of “the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution thereof”. However, para. 2 of the same provision states that 
“such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment 
of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or 
standards.” This provision is mirrored in Art. 211 para. 4 LOSC, according to which coastal 
State’s laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution 
from foreign vessels shall, in accordance with Part II, section 3 LOSC, not hamper the 
innocent passage of foreign vessels. 
With regards to the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State in the territorial sea, 
Arts. 27 and 220 para. 2 allow the coastal State to undertake actions against foreign-flagged 
vessels, including physical inspection of the vessel relating to the violation “where there are 
clear grounds for believing that the vessel navigating in the territorial sea has, during its 
passage therein, violated laws and regulations of that State” and, “where the evidence so 
warrants, to institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its 
laws”. However, the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State on the territorial sea 
 
139 Noyes J., “The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone”, in Rothwell D. et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
the Law of the Sea Oxford University Press (2015), p. 91. 
140 LOSC Article 18 para. 2.  
141 LOSC Article 19 para. 1.  
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depends on the legality of prescriptive jurisdiction and must be in line with the obligation not 
to hamper the right of innocent passage enjoyed by foreign-flagged vessels.142 
These provisions are of paramount importance since they lay out the rights of coastal 
States in their territorial sea and their limits. Importantly, they connect the laws and 
regulations of the coastal State to GAIRS. As it was described before, the IMO has yet to take 
action to regulate HFO use and carriage in the Arctic Waters. As a result, there are no GAIRS 
in place regarding the regulation of HFO as such.  
Molenaar identifies three methods available to coastal States in order to unilaterally 
combat vessel-source pollution: the setting of discharge or emission standards, the setting of 
CDEM standards, and the setting of navigational standards.143  
Navigational standards and measures usually include routeing measures, ship 
reporting systems, vessel traffic services etc. A possible such standard that would affect the 
use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic would be to designate specific areas that vessels using 
or carrying HFO would not be allowed to navigate. However, to date, neither Iceland and 
Norway, nor any other Arctic State, have taken measures that would set navigational 
standards.  
Consequently, in order to assess whether a unilateral regulation on HFO use and 
carriage is prescribed and enforced in accordance with the relevant LOSC provisions, it is 
necessary to examine how such a regulation may be prescribed and what aspects of HFO use 
and carriage it is targeting. Since HFO is a general term, under which a number of different 
fuels can fall, whether a coastal State’s legislation sets discharge/emission standards, CDEM 
standards or a measure that falls outside these categories depends on the nature of the 
legislation and the way it is framed.  
The relevant legislation of both Iceland and Norway is applicable in the respective 
territorial seas of the two States. For Iceland, it is applicable in the whole breadth of its 
territorial sea, including the internal waters and ports, while for Norway it is focused on 
specific areas that form a large part of its territorial sea surrounding the Svalbard Archipelago.  
 
142 LOSC Art. 24 para. 1 and Art. 220 para. 2 which states that the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State is 
“without prejudice to the application of the relevant provisions of Part II, section 3”; Kopela S., “Making Ships 
cleaner: Reducing Air Pollution from international Shipping”, 26 Review of European, Comparative and 
International Environmental Law 231 (2017), p. 239. 
143 Kopela (2017), ibid.; Molenaar E., Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution, Kluwer Law 
International (1998), p. 21.  
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2.1.1 Legal Considerations on the HFO Regulation in the Icelandic Legislation  
As it was already noted, the recently amended Icelandic Regulation on the Sulphur 
Content of specific liquid Fuels intends to effectively ban the use of HFO in the territorial sea 
of Iceland by limiting the sulphur content of liquid fuel. Even though the Icelandic legislation 
is setting emission standards, Iceland has decided to promote it as targeting HFO as such.144 
However, it is evident that the new legislation does not ban HFO use and carriage based on 
MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43 definition, but follows the logic behind the Sulphur 
Oxides Regulation. It also uses a different definition of HFO (called “black oil” or 
“Svartolía”) which is based on the distillation of the fuel following the ASTM D86 method.145 
The different definition can be explained since HFO is, as already stated, a general term used 
to describe a number of residual products.146 However, this definition along with the 
following provisions indicate that the focus of the Icelandic legislation is on the sulphur 
content of the fuel, rather than its other technical characteristics.  
According to the recent amendment in the Icelandic legislation “Sulphur content in 
marine fuels, including black oil (i.e. HFO) used or intended for use in ships or boats in 
Iceland within Icelandic territorial waters and intrinsically shall not exceed 0.1% m/m 
excluding fuels for ships using approved methods to reduce emissions.”147. The 0.1% m/m 
limit is the same as in sulphur ECAs. This provision is intended to apply to all ships, 
regardless of the flag they fly, including ships embarking on their journey outside the 
European Economic Area.148 As a result, the sulphur limit set out by the Icelandic legislation 
is smaller than the limit imposed by the Sulphur Oxides Regulation, which is set at 0,50% 
m/m.  
 The issue that arises in this instant is whether Iceland is in position to set stricter limits 
than those set out by the competent international organization. This issue arises with respect 
to the application of the regulation in the territorial sea, since Iceland has the right to impose 
the standards it sees fit in its internal waters and ports without having to abide by international 
standards.  
 
144 Iceland, Press Release of 6 December 2019, supra n. 34.   
145 Iceland, Regulation no. 124/2015, supra n. 33, Art. 3 para. 15; The ASTM D86 method is defined in para. 2 
of the same provision as “A method prescribed by the American Society for Testing and Materials in its 1976 
publication on the definitions and specifications of standards for petroleum products and lubricants, as 
amended”. For the ASTM D86 method see American Society for Testing and Materials International, “Standard 
Test Method for Distillation of Petroleum Products and Liquid Fuels at Atmospheric Pressure”, available at 
<https://www.astm.org/Standards/D86>, last accessed 14 September 2020. 
146 MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43; See also PAME, Alternative Fuels in the Arctic, supra n. 130. 
147 Iceland, Regulation no. 1084/2019, supra n. 32, Art. 2.  
148 Ibid. 
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Emission standards are perceived to be similar to discharge standards and not to 
CDEM standards in the way they are referred to in Art. 21 para. 2.149 CDEM standards are the 
same throughout a ship’s voyage, while emissions can be different depending on the fuel used 
in different parts of the journey. Even more so, emissions of harmful substances, such as 
sulphur, can fall under the definition of pollution which is provided for in Art. 1, para. 1 (4) 
LOSC. As such, they may be regulated by the coastal State on the basis of Art. 21 para. 1 (f) 
and 211 para. 4 LOSC. Molenaar notes that specifically Art. 21 para. 1(f) allows a coastal 
State to set unilateral emission standards even if they could have an incidental effect of the 
CDEM of a foreign flagged ship.150 However, regulations that are targeting specifically 
emission standards and not the content of fuel in order to set an emission standard, may prove 
difficult to be enforced. Violations are to be detected during a voyage using devices such as 
sniffers which measure the content of emissions in a ship’s exhaust gas.151 
An easier approach to regulate emissions is by adopting regulation that sets specified 
fuel contents, a violation of which can be detected by examining fuel samples either during 
the voyage or when the ship calls at port.152 That way, the vessel will be complying with the 
emission standards set out by the coastal State since it would only be allowed to use specific 
kinds of fuel.  
The Sulphur Oxides Regulation is a typical example of a setting of emission standards 
by regulating fuel content that is to be considered GAIRS. Every coastal State, and not only 
the Arctic littoral States, are now in position to prescribe laws in accordance with the 
regulation that will limit the sulphur content of fuel or require vessels to install an EGCS if 
they wish to continue using HFO. However, it is necessary to assess whether standards that 
are related to the content of fuels apply to the CDEM of foreign ships or not, in order for a 
States to go beyond the Sulphur Oxides Regulation and prescribe stricter standards.  
According to Molenaar, the regulation of the content of fuel is different from an 
emission standard and should be considered as an equipment standard “as it concerns a 
requirement to ensure that an emission standard is met”.153 However, Kopela correctly points 
out that a legislation that regulates content or quality of fuel does not necessarily prescribe 
 
149 Kopela (2017), supra n. 142, p. 239.   
150 Molenaar (1998), supra n. 143, p. 502.  
151 Fanø, supra n. 89, p. 281.  
152 Ibid. See also Molenaar (1998), supra n. 143, p. 22. 
153 Molenaar (1998), ibid., p. 67.  
 
Page 28 of 59 
CDEM standards, nor can fuel itself be regarded as equipment.154 As a result, if a regulation 
only sets standards on quality of fuel without prescribing special CDEM standards (that could 
still be utilized by the ship owner as a means for enhancing cost-effectiveness and flexibility 
in the implementation), such a regulation should not be considered as applying to the CDEM 
of vessels.155 In the same manner, a study commissioned by the EU argues that Art. 21 para. 2 
should be narrowly interpreted since it functions as an exception to the general principle of 
coastal State sovereignty in its territorial sea.156 Following that argumentation, a regulation 
that goes beyond the limits set out by the Sulphur Oxides Regulation should be considered to 
be in accordance with the relevant LOSC provisions, even if it includes provisions on the 
installment of EGCSs as an alternative means for vessels to comply with it.  
Consequently, the Icelandic legislation is deemed to be in accordance with the 
relevant LOSC provisions even though it is stricter than the IMO’s Sulphur Oxides 
regulation, since it does not prescribe CDEM standards but rather fuel content standards. In 
addition, Art. 13 of the Regulation states that “The ship shall not be required to deviate from 
its intended voyage or to be unnecessarily delayed”, thus safeguarding the right of innocent 
passage enjoyed by all vessels.  
In the same manner, the Icelandic legislation states that ships may continue using 
HFO if they adhere to use approved emission abatement methods to reduce the release of 
sulphur dioxide, that include exhaust systems.157 The installation of an EGCS indeed sets an 
equipment requirement but is not prescribed as mandatory for the navigation of vessels. 
Instead, it is provided for as a supplementary measure to facilitate the navigation of vessels 
that wish to continue using high sulphur HFO.  
Regarding the enforcement jurisdiction of Iceland, Art. 13 of the Regulation provides 
for a number of measures that can be taken during the control of vessels which include 
supervision of the equipment and taking samples from ships, tanks and oil depots for further 
analysis. If a ship does not meet the standards set by the Icelandic legislation, the competent 
authority, which is the Environment and Food Agency, may require the master to submit a 
report regarding the measures taken in order to comply with the rules and to provide proof 
 
154 Kopela (2017), supra n. 142, p. 239; See also Ringbom (2008), supra n. 49, p. 433, who, however, reaches 
the conclusion that “it is probably safer to consider fuel quality requirements as being analogous to CDEM 
standards”. 
155 Kopela (2017), ibid. 
156 BMT, Murray Fenton Edon Liddiard Vince Limited, “Study on the Economic, Legal Environmental and 
Practical Implications of a European Union System to Reduce Ship Emissions of SO2 and NOx” No 3623, 
(August 2000), Appendix 4, para 70. 
157 Iceland, Regulation no. 124/2014, supra n. 33, Art. 12, Annex I and Annex II. The other two approved 
methods are the use of biofuels and the use of mixture of marine fuels.   
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that an attempt was made to purchase fuel for the ship, in accordance with the requirements of 
the regulation, and in accordance with the ship’s sea plan, and, provided that the fuel was not 
available for purchase, that an attempt was made to supply such fuel.158 Otherwise, according 
to the following provision, the competent authorities may take coercive measures or impose 
sanctions due to the violation. Even if it is not stated explicitly, the nature of the measures 
listed in Art. 13 of the Icelandic legislation indicates that the enforcement acts are to be taken 
by virtue of port State jurisdiction since they would be practically difficult to commence 
while a ship is sailing through the territorial sea.  
Finally, the Icelandic legislation does not make a mention of the regulation of carriage 
of HFO. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the legislation follows the IMO regulation on a 
carriage ban for fuels which the sulphur limit exceeds 0,50% m/m and not the more stringent 
limit set out by Iceland on 0,1% m/m. 
2.1.2 Legal Considerations on the HFO Regulation in the Norwegian Legislation  
 The relevant Norwegian legislation is not as far-reaching as the Icelandic one in the 
sense that it does not regulate the use of HFO in every part of the Norwegian territorial sea, 
but rather on specific protected areas surrounding Svalbard. That can be partially explained 
since a large part of Norway’s territorial sea is already a sulphur ECA. Nevertheless, Art. 4 of 
the Regulations on the National Parks of Svalbard limits the ban on the “national parks” 
which are defined in the corresponding provisions of Arts. 12 and 13 and the map of 
Appendix 1 of the Regulations. As a result, the ban applies to ships entering and navigating 
these areas, excluding some small navigational routes.159 
The second, and most important, difference is the fact that the Norwegian legislation 
utilizes a definition of HFO that does not refer specifically to the contents of the fuel. Rather, 
according to Arts. 4 and 16 of the Regulation, “Ships entering at national parks/reserves shall 
not use or carry on board fuel other than the quality DMA in accordance with ISO 8217 Fuel 
Standard”.  
The ISO 8217 Specification classifies fuels not only based on their sulphur content, 
but includes different technical test methods, such as density, oxidation stability, total 
 
158 Iceland, Regulation no. 124/2015, supra n. 33, Art. 13. 
159 Knudsen H., “No heavy fuel oil at Svalbard – A legal Ban?” 31 Ocean Yearbook 80 (2017), p. 87; See also 
PAME, Phase I, supra n. 7, p. 46.  
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sediment, lubricity, vanadium and sodium content et al.160 The PAME Reports on HFO and 
on Alternative Fuels in the Arctic can be of relevance in this case since they provide a broader 
analysis of the definition of HFO in accordance with ISO 8217 Fuel Standards. The drafters 
of the reports note that HFO under the definition provided for in the MARPOL Annex I, 
Chapter 9, Reg. 43, that classifies fuels as HFO based on their density or kinematic viscosity 
at a certain temperature, includes residual marine fuel or mixtures containing mainly residual 
fuel and some distillate fuel such as intermediate fuel oil, corresponding to certain qualities, 
under the ISO 8217 Specification of Marine Fuel.161 As a result, a regulation based on that or 
a similar definition, cannot be strictly regarded as setting emission standards, but rather as 
regulating the use of a fuel as such, even though the practical effects of such a definition are 
similar. 
Consequently, the question that arises is whether the Norwegian legislation that 
prescribes the use of DMA-grade fuel in the protected areas of the territorial sea surrounding 
Svalbard applies to the CDEM of foreign-flagged vessels without giving effect to GAIRS.  
As it was noted fuel itself can hardly be characterized as being a part of the equipment 
of a vessel.162 Consequently, it is again imperative to examine whether such a regulation 
would otherwise impact the CDEM of a ship without giving effect to GAIRS in a way that 
would hamper the right of innocent passage enjoyed by foreign flagged vessels. In a case that 
such a regulation prescribes the use of certain fuels, such as LNG, biofuels et al., instead of 
HFO, that would warrant a radical change of the ship’s equipment necessary. It is apparent 
that such a regulation should be considered as being in contravention to the relevant LOSC 
provisions.  
However, the same conclusion cannot be easily reached in the case of a regulation that 
simply bans the use of HFO based on a technical definition without prescribing certain 
measures that are to be implemented. Such a legislation would leave room for the industry to 
use distillate fuels that would not fall under the definition of HFO but still will not warrant the 
adjustment of vessels for the use and carriage of even lighter fuels, such as hybrid fuels, LNG, 
biofuel etc.The PAME Report notes that, in accordance with that definition, products that do 
not exceed specifications set by MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Reg. 43 will typically include 
distillate fuels - in this report referred to as marine gas oil (MGO) and marine diesel oil 
 
160 See International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO 8217:2012(en) Petroleum products—Fuels 
(class F)—Specifications of marine fuels, available at <https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:8217:ed-
6:v1:en>, last accessed 14 September 2020. 
161 PAME, Phase I, supra n. 7, p. 5.  
162 Kopela (2017), supra n. 142, p. 239. 
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(MDO), or just distillates, normally corresponding to qualities within the DM(X, A, Z, B) of 
ISO 8217 and are considered lighter.163 The PAME Report on Alternative Fuels in the Arctic 
indicates the kind of converter technology needed for vessels to navigate in certain fuels that 
were investigated therein.164 In accordance with these findings, vessels can rely on internal 
combustion engines when using HFO, MDO/MGO, and low sulphur hybrids.165  
However, the Norwegian legislation does not leave great leeway to shipowners to 
choose between these lighter fuels, but instead specifically prescribes the use of only DMA-
grade fuel in accordance with ISO 8217 Fuel Standard. Some adjustments will be warranted 
necessary to the engines and tanks of vessels that today use HFO in order to use only the 
lighter distillate fuel. Using fuels with too low viscosity into machinery not designed for such 
may lead to technical problems.166 Whether such adjustments are to be viewed as analogous 
to CDEM standards, and thus cannot go beyond GAIRS, depends on the extent that they are 
required and on whether they would result in hampering the right of innocent passage enjoyed 
by foreign flagged vessels. Henriksen, reviewing the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act 
notes that it is “doubtful” whether a regulation the Norwegian ban of HFO “would be 
consistent with the right of coastal States to regulate innocent passage through the territorial 
sea”.167 Nevertheless, to date, no State has contested the Norwegian legislation either in IMO 
or otherwise. This author agrees with the assertions noted earlier that the use of equipment or 
the modification of existing equipment that facilitates compliance with such standards shall 
be viewed as incidental.168 As a result, adjustments to already existing internal combustion 
engines should not be regarded as setting CDEM requirements. Of course, shipowners still 
have the choice to make alteration to the CDEM of their vessels if they wish to use lighter 
fuels such as hybrid fuels, LNG, biofuel etc., but that should come as a voluntary choice, in 
the same manner as the installation of an EGCS is voluntary in the case of the Sulphur Oxides 
Regulation.  
 A final note is due to the ban of HFO carriage imposed by the Norwegian legislation. 
This carriage ban also goes beyond set GAIRS since it bans vessels that carry any other fuel 
 
163 PAME Phase I, supra n. 7, pp. 4-5.  
164 PAME, Alternative Fuels in the Arctic, supra n. 130, p. 37, Table 5.1; See also WWF Canada, “Phasing Out 
the Use and Carriage for Use of Heavy Fuel Oil in the Canadian Arctic: Impacts to Northern Communities” 
(2018), available at 
<https://d2akrl9rvxl3z3.cloudfront.net/downloads/wwf_hfo_phase_out_impacts_final_reduced.pdf>, last 
accessed 14 September 2020, p. 3.  
165 PAME Alternative Fuels in the Arctic, ibid.  
166 PAME Phase I, supra n. 7, p. 8.  
167 Henriksen, supra n. 28, p. 271; See also Knudsen, supra n. 159, p. 97, who supports that the norwegian 
legislation sets CDEM Standards.  
168 Kopela (2017), supra n. 142, p. 239; BMT Study supra n. 156. 
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than the one prescribed. Indeed, a carriage ban is an effective way of implementing relevant 
regulations and making sure that vessels will comply with them and not use different kinds of 
fuels during their voyage. However, this ban is based merely on the assumption that vessels 
would change between the fuels used and carried in the course of a travel. A unilateral 
carriage ban on the territorial sea of a State that does not adhere or goes beyond GAIRS set by 
IMO, including the Sulphur Oxides Regulation, may not be regarded as being in accordance 
with the relevant LOSC provisions for that reason. It will probably hamper the innocent 
passage enjoyed by vessels that wish to pass through a territorial sea carrying but not using 
non-compliant fuel. Even foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other 
inherently dangerous or noxious substances can still exercise the right of innocent passage 
subject to Art. 23 LOSC, irrespective of the dangers posed to the marine environment by the 
carriage of such substances. A total carriage ban of HFO going beyond GAIRS would be 
based on a mere assumption and would be in contravention with the purpose and function of 
LOSC as is stipulated in the relevant provisions. Consequently, a carriage ban may be 
implemented only in the case it gives effect to GAIRS as to not deny foreign-flagged vessels 
the right of innocent passage which is enjoyed by ships of all States.  
2.2 Coastal State Jurisdiction in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
The prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State is even more narrow 
in the EEZ. The coastal State does not have full sovereignty in the EEZ, it enjoys however a 
number of sovereign rights and jurisdiction, making the EEZ a sui generis zone, subject to a 
distinct jurisdictional framework to both the territorial sea and the high seas.169 This fact 
makes it particularly difficult for coastal States to adopt unilateral measures that would affect 
the navigational rights enjoyed by third States in their EEZs.  
The coastal State also enjoys jurisdiction regarding, amongst others, the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. According to Art. 56 para. 2, the coastal State shall 
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible 
with the provisions of the LOSC when exercising its rights and performing its duties in the 
EEZ.  
 According to Art. 211 para. 5, the coastal State can “adopt laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and giving effect to 
generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent 
 
169 Tanaka, supra n. 41, p. 126; Evans M. “The Law of the Sea”, in Evans M. (ed.) International Law, 4th 
edition, Oxford University Press (2014), p. 673. 
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international organization”. The wording of this provision makes it clear that the jurisdiction 
of the coastal State is severely restrained since it can only conform and give effect to GAIRS 
in every aspect of the regulation of vessel activities in the EEZ, without the CDEM 
prerequisite that is set for the territorial sea.170  
 The enforcement powers of the coastal State are also restrained and linked to GAIRS, 
as the wording of Art. 220 para. 3 suggests. Moreover, the coastal State has to meet a high 
threshold in order to take actions against vessels and it must follow a burdensome procedure 
set out in Art. 220. The “default rule” is that the coastal State may only require the vessel to 
give certain information such as its identity and port of registry, while physical inspection of 
the vessel is not allowed in cases of violations of laws and regulations of the coastal State.171 
According to paras. 5 and 6 of the same provision, a coastal State will be able to conduct a 
physical inspection and institute proceedings against a vessel in violation of applicable rules 
unless the violation results, according to objective evidence, in a discharge.172 
As a result, no State will be in position to regulate use and carriage of HFO until IMO 
adopts such a regulation and is given the status of GAIRS. For the time being, Arctic coastal 
States may implement the Sulphur Oxides Regulation in their EEZ in order to impose 
restrictions on emissions that are connected to the use and carriage of HFO by vessels.  
Iceland has declared an EEZ where it enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction. It has 
set the sulphur limit on its EEZ on 0.50% m/m, which is applicable to all ships, irrespective of 
the flag they fly.173 This limit is in accordance with the Sulphur Oxides Regulation and the 
relevant LOSC provisions regarding the coastal State’s rights and duties in its EEZ.  
Norway, on the other hand, is not in position to do so regarding Svalbard, since it has 
not declared an EEZ off Svalbard Archipelago but rather a Fisheries Protective Zone.174 
Furthermore, there is a lingering question on whether Norway can declare an EEZ in Svalbard 
due to the conditions set out by the 1920 Spitsbergen/Svalbard Treaty.175 
 
 
170 Kopela (2017), supra n. 142,  p. 239.  
171 Hamamoto “Article 220”, in Proelss A. (ed.), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A 
Commentary, Hart Publishing (2017), p. 1509. 
172 Hamamoto ibid., p. 1510 
173 Iceland, Regulation no. 1084/2019, supra n. 32, Art. 2. 
174 Henriksen, supra n. 28, p. 253. 
175 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (adopted 9 February 1920, entered into force 14 August 
1925) 2 LNTS 7; For the discussion on whether Norway is able to declare an EEZ in Svalbard see Pedersen T. 
and Henriksen T., “Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of legal Uncertainty?” 24 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 141 (2009) and Molenaar E., “Fisheries Regulation in the Maritime Zones of Svalbard” 
27 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 3 (2012), pp. 7-26. 
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2.3 Coastal State Jurisdiction by virtue of Article 234 LOSC 
Art. 234 LOSC is the sole provision of Section 8 of Part XII, often referred to as “the 
Arctic exception” since it is the only LOSC provision specifically applicable in the Arctic.176 
It was negotiated between Canada, the USSR and the US and is building upon the theme of 
rare and fragile ecosystems of Art. 194 para. 5 LOSC177 while also considered lex specialis to 
Art. 211 paras. 5 and 6.178  
Art. 234 could be used as a basis for the regulation of HFO use and carriage in the 
Arctic. Its interpretation is troubling academics since LOSC’s adoption. The powers it confers 
to the coastal State are unambiguously broader than the powers the coastal States have in non 
ice-covered areas. However, Iceland and Norway, as the only States that have adopted 
relevant legislation on HFO have not -and, as it will be examined, could not have- based their 
national laws on Art. 234 LOSC.  
According to the wording of the provision, Art. 234 LOSC is applicable in “ice-covered 
areas”. The mentioning of “severe climatic conditions” and the temporal requirement “for 
most of the year” in the wording of the provision imply that its application does not require 
ice-coverage throughout all year. Since ice conditions are not predictable, it should suffice 
that the general features of the climate be taken into account, as long as the presence of ice is 
not incidental or for a small amount of time.179 
This fact means that Art. 234 cannot be applied in the whole breadth of the Arctic 
Waters, at least not in the way they are defined by the Polar Code, but only to those areas 
“where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for 
most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation.” The exact locations 
where the ice conditions warrant for the application of Art. 234 are to be set by the Arctic 
coastal States that can base their legislation upon it. Moreover, these ice-covered locations are 
diminishing as time passes, due to the continuous shrinking of ice-coverage attributable to 
climate change. 
 
176 Nordquist, Rosenne and Yankov, supra n. 135, Volume IV, p. 393; Franckx E. and Boone L., “Article 234” 
in Proelss A. (ed.), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, Hart Publishing 
(2017), p. 1570. 
177 Nordquist, Rosenne and Yankov, ibid., Volume IV, p. 393. 
178 Ibid.; Chircop A. et al, “Course Convergence? Comparative Perspectives on the Governance of Navigation 
and Shipping in Canadian and Russian Arctic Waters”, 28 Ocean Yearbook 291 (2014), p. 299.   
179 Nordquist, Rosenne and Yankov, ibid., p. 397; See also Bartenstein K., “The ‘Arctic Exception’ in the Law of 
the Sea Convention: A Contribution to safer Navigation in the Northwest Passage?”, 42 Ocean Development and 
International Law 22 (2011), p. 31, where the author notes that a different interpretation would require the 
coastal State to adopt a “a twin set of measures applying to the Arctic, one for the ice-free moments and another 
for the rest of the year” a procedure that would be burdensome to both the coastal State and third States. 
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Iceland is not considered an Arctic coastal State by the “Arctic Five” that issued the 
2008 Ilulissat Declaration, a decision that was however criticized by Iceland along with 
Sweden, Finland and the Arctic Council’s permanent participants.180 Nevertheless, Iceland is 
not able to base its legislation on Art. 234 since the waters under its jurisdiction cannot be 
described as “ice-covered” for most of the year. The Polar Code is also not applicable to 
Icelandic waters, since they do not fall under the definition of Arctic Waters that the Polar 
Code utilizes.181  
Norway on the other hand has yet to take an official position concerning the 
interpretation of Article 234 and its legislation does not refer specifically to “ice-covered 
areas” since the waters surrounding its mainland are not ice-covered.182 Moreover, it is not 
clear whether Norway is in position to implement Art. 234 in the waters surrounding the 
Svalbard Archipelago. As it was noted earlier, Norway has not declared an EEZ off Svalbard 
Archipelago but rather a Fisheries Protective Zone.183 The measures a State may take in 
accordance with Art. 234 LOSC can be prescribed in its EEZ. Whether these measures can 
also be applied in the whole breadth of the EEZ measured from the baselines, and thus 
including the territorial sea of the coastal State, is a matter of controversy that will be 
addressed in the following pages. Nevertheless, suffice to say that to suggest that an Arctic 
State can rely on Art. 234 to prescribe and enforce regulations in its territorial sea and not in 
its EEZ (especially as is the case with Norway and Svalbard where no EEZ has even been 
declared) would be in total contravention with the wording of the provision. Molenaar, 
however, notes that Norway would today be entitled to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 
234 in relation to Svalbard, subject to the Spitsbergen Treaty, 184 without however entering the 
discussion regarding the interpretation of the provision. Nevertheless, Norway does not base 
its HFO regulation on Art. 234, avoiding thus the question regarding its application on the 
waters surrounding Svalbard.  
 The above considerations mean than in the context of the jurisdiction conferred to the 
coastal State by virtue of Art. 234, Iceland and Norway do not and cannot base their 
legislation on HFO use and carriage on said provision. This warrants the brief examination of 
the practice of the rest of the Arctic coastal States necessary, in order to assess whether they 
 
180 Molenaar E., “The Arctic, the Arctic Council and the Law of the Sea”, in Beckman R. et al. (eds.) 
Governance of Arctic Shipping, Brill Nijhoff (2017), p. 60.  
181 Henriksen, supra n. 28, p. 257. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid., p. 253. 
184 Molenaar E., “Options for regional Regulation of Merchant Shipping outside IMO, with particular Reference 
to the Arctic Region”, 45 Ocean Development and International Law 272 (2014), p. 277. 
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can regulate HFO use and carriage in the ice-covered areas in the waters under their 
jurisdiction if they decide to do so.  
 The USA is notably not a member of the LOSC. Its views and practice regarding the 
application of Art. 234 have been described as inconsistent,185 even if it views LOSC Part XII 
as customary law, including Article 234.186 It has not adopted specific legislation on “ice-
covered areas” or a similar term, but it contains special provisions about shipping in the 
Alaskan Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet south of the Aleutian Islands, areas that may 
be ice-covered sometimes through a year.187 
Denmark, acting on behalf of Greenland, does not rely on Art. 234 LOSC in the 
regulation of its maritime zones.188 Nevertheless, Denmark’s Arctic Strategy notes that it 
“[…] will consider implementing non-discriminatory regional safety and environmental rules 
for navigation in the Arctic in consultation with the other Arctic states and taking into account 
international law, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions regarding 
navigation in ice-covered waters”.189 Hartman observes that this statement refers to Art. 234 
LOSC, 190 but, since then, Denmark has not taken any steps in that direction, nor has it stated 
in which parts of the Greenlandic waters such a legislation would apply.  
So far, only Canada and the Russian Federation have adopted legislation that is 
explicitly based upon Art. 234.191 Both States favor a broad interpretation of the provision. 
Canada on the one hand had adopted legislation on the protection of its ice-covered sea areas 
even before the adoption of the LOSC and viewed the inclusion of Art. 234 in the provisions 
of LOSC as a validation of its legislation. Similarly, Russia bases its legislation on Art. 234. 
However, the legislation of both Canada and Russia have been contested mainly by the USA.  
The legislation of these two States do not include provisions that regulate HFO use and 
carriage. However, the analysis of the provision and whether it can be used to regulate HFO 
use and carriage, and to what extent, remains relevant to the issue at hand, since Art. 234 
LOSC is the sole LOSC provision explicitly applicable in the Arctic. In the hypothetical 
 
185 Fields S., “Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The overlooked Linchpin for 
achieving Safety and Security in the US Arctic?” 7 Harvard National Security Journal 55 (2016), p. 74.  
186 Ibid.   
187 Brubaker D., “The Arctic – Navigational Issues under International Law of the Sea”, 2 The Yearbook of Polar 
Law 7 (2010), p. 64; See also USA, Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 USC 2701 (1990), V and VIII.  
188 Hartman J., “Regulating Shipping in the Arctic Ocean: An Analysis of State Practice”, 49 Ocean 
Development and International Law 276 (2018), p. 287.   
189 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, available at <https://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/60-denmarks-arctic-strategy>, last accessed 14 
September 2020, p. 18.  
190 Hartman, supra n. 188, p. 287. 
191 For a general discussion on the legislation of these two States see ibid. pp. 284-287 and Franckx and Boone 
supra n. 176, p. 1580-1584. 
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scenario that a State such as Canada or Russia wished to regulate HFO in the ice-covered 
areas of the waters under their jurisdiction, they would probably choose to rely on this 
provision to prescribe and enforce the relevant measures.192 Still, a meticulous interpretation 
of the conditions attached to applying the provision falls out of the scope of this Thesis.193 It 
rather focuses on whether coastal States may utilize Art. 234 in order to regulate HFO use and 
carriage in the waters under their jurisdiction.  
As of the territorial application of Art. 234, the provision states that it shall apply 
“within the limits of the EEZ”, provided that the ice conditions described exist. As it was 
already noted, the ratione loci application of the provision, specifically whether the “limits of 
the EEZ” means only the outer limits or the inner limits too, is an issue of controversy.  
If one is to apply a strict grammatical interpretation to the provision, they will arrive to 
the conclusion that Art. 234 is only applicable only on the EEZ, i.e. from the outer limit of the 
territorial sea to the outer 200 n.m. outer limit of the EEZ.194 On this matter, Franckx and 
Boone suggest that a “broader interpretation conflicts with Art. 55, which recognizes an inner 
limit of the EEZ and therefore expands the ordinary meaning of ‘within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone’”.195 They also add that the intention of the negotiators was not 
clearly established on this matter,196 even if the Virginia Commentary suggests that this 
expression was deliberate and results in a broader interpretation.197 
However, the interpretation offered by Franckx and Boone cannot be supported by a 
teleological point of view, in light of the object and purpose of LOSC, in accordance with Art. 
31 para. 1 VCLT. It stands to reason that Art. 234 allocates prescriptive and enforcement 
powers to the coastal State, in order to adequately protect the fragile Arctic marine 
environment. This jurisdiction is broader than the powers conferred to the coastal State by 
virtue of other LOSC provisions. Bartenstein correctly suggests that whether Art. 234 applies 
to the territorial sea depends on the actual powers that Art. 234 confers to the coastal State. If 
these powers are indeed more far reaching than those reconciled by the innocent passage 
 
192 It must be noted that this is strictly a hypothetical scenario, especially considering the fact that both States 
pushed for exceptions, waivers and a larger timeframe in the currently negotiated HFO ban in the Arctic. 
193 For the discussion around the interpretation around Art. 234 LOSC see Bartenstein supra n. 179, Franckx and 
Boone supra n. 176, McRae D. and Goundrey D., “Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters: The Extent of 
Article 234,” 16 University of British Columbia Law Review 197 (1982) and Pharand D., “The Arctic Waters 
and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit”, 38 Ocean Development and International Law 3 (2007). 
194 This interpretation is supported in Roach J., “Arctic Navigation: Recent Developments”, in Nordquist M. et 
al., Challenges of the Changing Arctic, Brill Nijhoff (2016), p. 228 and in Franckx and Boone, supra n. 176, p. 
1575-1576.  
195 Franckx and Boone ibid.. 
196 Ibid.  
197 Nordquist, Rosenne and Yankov, supra n. 135, Volume IV, p. 397; This is also acknowledged in Franckx and 
Boone, ibid., p. 1576, n. 61. 
 
Page 38 of 59 
regime, it would seem logical that Art. 234 can be applied on the territorial sea.198 
Specifically, it is argued that in order to adequately protect and preserve the fragile Arctic 
marine environment, Arctic coastal States should be able to impose CDEM requirements on 
foreign-flagged vessels that aim not only to the protection of the marine environment, but also 
to the safety of navigation.199 This is also supported by taking into account that the Polar 
Code, which is to be considered a relevant rule of international law in accordance with Art. 31 
para. 3 (c) VCLT, sets mainly CDEM standards in order to protect the polar environments, 
albeit these standards are to be imposed primarily by the flag States. 
If the literal interpretation of the provision is accepted, that would mean that the Arctic 
coastal States would be able to impose CDEM requirements in the EEZ without having to 
refer to GAIRS, since there is no such requirement in Art. 234.200 On the contrary, Art. 234 
only requires that the adopted measures to show due regard to navigation and to be “based on 
the best available scientific evidence”. At the same time, the coastal States would still be 
required to refer to GAIRS if they wish to adopt CDEM requirements in their territorial sea 
by virtue of Art. 21 para. 2 LOSC. That would mean that the Arctic coastal States would have 
greater prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in their EEZs than in their territorial seas. It 
is obvious that such an interpretation is in contradiction with the object and purpose of LOSC 
and its remaining provisions.  
Following the aforementioned, two important conclusions are made. First, that Art. 234 
is applicable in the whole breadth of the EEZ, that is from the baselines to the 200 n.m. outer 
limit. Secondly, that Art. 234 confers to the coastal State the power to adopt and enforce rules 
and regulations on, amongst others, CDEM standards, without having to refer to GAIRS. 
Regulations on emissions standards would also be permissible, even more so since the 
Sulphur Oxides Regulation is considered GAIRS, even though there is not such a requirement 
in the wording of Art. 234.  
As a result, the question of whether a regulation on HFO usage would set an 
emission/discharge standard, regulate the content of fuel or apply to the CDEM of vessels 
becomes moot when Art. 234 applies. The Arctic coastal States with ice-covered EEZs would 
be in position to impose and enforce a HFO regulation, as long as the other requirements of 
Art. 234 are met. Specifically that such a regulation shall not be discriminatory and “shall 
have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
 
198 Bartenstein, supra n. 179, p. 30.   
199 Ibid. p. 43; Franckx and Boone, supra n. 176, p. 1575. 
200 See also Gavouneli supra n. 42, p. 71 who observes that “there is a conspicuous absence of any further 
reference to the ‘competent international organisation’ or the world community at large”. 
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based on the best available scientific evidence”, thus striking a balance between the 
navigational rights that third States still enjoy in ice-covered areas and the need to protect and 
preserve this fragile environment.  
3. Port State Jurisdiction  
The State enjoys full sovereignty in its ports and internal waters, which form part of 
its territory. The regime of internal waters is a direct consequence of the recognition of the 
legitimacy of straight baselines.201 According to Art. 8 para. 1 LOSC the internal waters are 
“those waters which lie landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured”. 
Art. 2 LOSC provides that the coastal State enjoys full sovereignty in its internal waters. This 
sovereignty encompasses prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction, subject only to the 
limitations imposed under international law.202 Unlike the territorial sea, the right of innocent 
passage does not apply in the internal waters of a coastal State, unless in the case of Art. 8 
para. 2 LOSC. 
 The port on the other hand is not specifically defined in LOSC. Arts. 11 and 12 hint 
that a port includes, amongst others, the outermost permanent harbor works and roadsteads 
that extend beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, provided they are normally used for 
the loading, unloading, and anchoring of ships.203 
The important distinction between port State jurisdiction and coastal State jurisdiction 
is the fact that the foreign-flagged vessels do not enjoy navigational rights therein, nor a right 
of access to ports.204 Instead, when they are allowed to call at port, they voluntarily submit 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the port State.205  
Violations of national laws and regulations that occurred in the internal waters or a 
port of a State are indeed covered by the State’ territorial jurisdiction.206 It is apparent that all 
foreign vessels within internal waters and anchoring at ports of a coastal State are subject to 
the criminal and civil laws and regulations of this State, except for sovereign immune 
 
201 Rothwell D. and Stephens T., The International Law of the Sea, 2nd edition, Hart Publishing (2016), p. 53; 
See also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1951, p. 116, p. 133. 
202 Tanaka, supra n. 41, p. 78. 
203 Molenaar E.,“Port and Coastal States”, in Rothwell D. et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the 
Sea Oxford University Press (2015), p. 280.  
204 An exception to this rule is a situation where a ship calls at port due to distress or force majeure, ibid., p. 284. 
205 Ibid., p. 280. 
206 Kopela S., “Port-State Jurisdiction, Extraterritoriality, and the Protection of global Commons”, 47 Ocean 
Development and International Law 89 (2016), p. 93 
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vessels.207 However, port States commonly do not exercise jurisdiction with respect to affairs 
that are deemed as “internal” to the ship and that do not affect the interests of the port State.208  
Based on this legal regime, LOSC has provided for a number of specific rights and 
obligations to the port State regarding the enforcement jurisdiction relating to the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.209 In the same vein, LOSC does not set forth 
significant limitations to port State jurisdiction.210 Instead, such limitations stem mostly from 
general principles regarding State jurisdiction, as well as other regimes of international law, 
such as international trade law.211 
Consequently, as State’s ports and internal waters are considered part of its territory, 
the State enjoys wide discretion in exercising this jurisdiction.212 This includes the entitlement 
of the port State to set entry to port requirements in order to accept or deny access to its ports 
to vessels which it considers do not comply with its laws and regulations.213 In addition, the 
port State may also prescribe conditions for leaving a port. These conditions for entering or 
leaving the port may include mandatory disposal of waste or the compliance with certain, 
unilaterally imposed, requirements, including requirements applicable to the CDEM of 
foreign-flagged vessels.214  
Port States can thus regulate entry into their ports by prescribing requirements that aim 
to the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, in accordance with Art. 211 para. 3 
LOSC. These entry into ports requirements are not linked to GAIRS by the wording of the 
provision and, subsequently, can go beyond them, as long as they are given due publicity and 
are communicated to the competent international organization, which would normally be 
IMO. These conditions are based on the territorial jurisdiction of the State. Nevertheless, as 
already noted, this wide discretion of port State jurisdiction is limited by possible treaty 
commitments, such as those imposed by trade agreements, and by the application of general 
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international law, such as the principles of non-discrimination and the prohibition of abuse of 
rights.215  
Consequently, States can regulate HFO use and carriage by prescribing certain 
limitations for vessels as conditions to enter (or leave) the port. If these regulations are in 
accordance with Art. 211 para. 3 LOSC, general international law and with the possible 
specific obligations of the prescribing State, then they shall be viewed as lawful. Especially 
for the Arctic, where ports that can facilitate large or many vessels are few, such entry 
requirements could be viewed as the optimal way to regulate HFO use and carriage. However, 
the two States that today regulate HFO use and carriage in the Arctic, Iceland and Norway, 
have not chosen to take this path, even though their legislation is applicable in their ports and 
internal waters. Iceland has not prescribed the applicable standards as entry requirements for 
Icelandic ports. Similarly, Norway has not included any provisions specifically in relation to 
port entry conditions regarding the ban of HFO use and carriage in the waters around 
Svalbard.  
However, both the Icelandic and the Norwegian legislations on HFO are applicable in 
the internal waters and ports of Iceland and Svalbard respectively. They do not contain 
specific provisions regarding measures they are to take by Iceland and Norway respectively in 
their capacity as port States, implying that the same provisions applicable in the territorial 
seas of the two States are also applicable in the internal waters and ports.  
Nevertheless, the applicability of the measures that are primarily prescribed for the 
territorial sea in the ports and internal waters of the two States raise important questions. 
Especially in case that either of these two States, or a third one, choose to impose specific 
HFO-related obligations on foreign-flagged vessels, the further analysis of the limits of port 
State jurisdiction is deemed imperative.  
As is the case for the territorial sea, the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of 
the port State regarding regulations on HFO depends, apart from the aforementioned 
limitations, on the way the legislation is framed, i.e. if it sets emission standards or content of 
fuel requirements or it applies to the CDEM of ships, emission standards, or none of the two.  
If an HFO regulation does not target neither CDEM standards nor emission standards 
but is rather based on the technical characteristics of the fuel, then it should be considered as 
permissible in accordance with the argument presented in Part III/2.1 of this Thesis.  
 
215 Ringbom (2016), supra n. 90, pp. 12-13.  
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The prescription and enforcement of legislation regarding CDEM standards, either as 
entry requirements or as applicable when a vessel calls at port, that go beyond GAIRS, raises 
a great controversy regarding their extraterritorial application.216 
CDEM standards are typically considered “static” standards, since the level of non-
compliance with such standards is uniform throughout a vessel’s voyage, including when it 
calls at port, as well as the maritime zones the ship traversers during its voyage.217 It is 
apparent that a failure to comply with CDEM standards could have adverse effects on the 
environment of a State’s ports or internal waters.218 As a result, a violation of a CDEM 
requirement that is prescribed as applicable only in the ports of a State can be based on the 
territorial jurisdiction the State enjoys therein, despite the extraterritorial effect that these 
measures may have.219 A port State is thus in position to “avoid” the implications posed by 
the GAIRS prerequisite found in the territorial sea regime. 
In this vein, port States may adopt and enforce regulations that require the use and 
carriage of certain types of fuel with certain characteristics on board.220 Such a requirement 
would be static, uniform throughout the ship’s voyage. A violation of such a regulation would 
be commenced in the port of the State, and thus the exercise of jurisdiction can be also based 
on the territorial jurisdiction of the State.  
On the other hand, a port State does not always have the same discretion on the 
regulation of activities such as discharges/emissions. Discharge/emission standards target the 
“behavior” of a vessel,221 so it is important to differentiate where exactly the violation took 
place. Of course, if the behavior amounts to a violation that actually takes place within the 
internal waters or the port of the State, then the port State is able to exercise its jurisdiction. 
However, the territorial jurisdiction of the port State cannot provide for the prescription and 
enforcement of regulations over activities that bear no relation to the State’s territory -
including all the maritime zones under its jurisdiction.222 In this vein, the behavior of a vessel 
is to be defined in geographical terms. As a result, the port State cannot prescribe and enforce 
laws and regulations on discharge and emissions standards that go beyond GAIRS with regard 
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to such activities that occur entirely out of its territory, i.e. on the high seas or waters under 
the jurisdiction of third States. 223  
In this vein, Art. 218 LOSC provides for an even more extended enforcement 
jurisdiction of the port State, since it allows it to undertake investigations and, where the 
evidence so warrants, institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel 
outside the internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ of that State in violation of applicable 
GAIRS. There is a lingering question on whether the term “discharge” used in Art. 218 LOSC 
can also cover emissions. As it was noted before, MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 11 para. 6 
states that the relevant LOSC rules on prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the 
marine environment from ships apply mutatis mutandis to the rules set out in MARPOL 
Annex VI.224 This provision means that for those States that are parties to MARPOL Annex 
VI discharges of ships will also include emissions, i.e. air pollution.225 Fanø, by basing his 
interpretation on the ordinary meaning of the words “discharge” and “emission”, arrives to the 
conclusion that, in accordance with Art. 31 para. 1 VCLT and the ordinary meaning of the 
words used, Art. 218 covers emissions from ships. These conclusions can also be supported 
by virtue of Art. 31 para. 3 (c) VCLT: MAPROL Annex VI is to be taken into account as a 
relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between the (hypothetical) parties 
when interpreting the meaning of the term discharge. Consequently, this provision is to be 
considered as covering the requirements set out by the Sulphur Oxides Regulation, by 
conferring extraterritorial jurisdiction to the port State over such violations. It must be also 
noted that this enforcement jurisdiction can only result in a monetary sanction in accordance 
with Art. 230 para. 1 LOSC, while the port State is under the obligation to notify the flag 
State in accordance with Art. 231 LOSC.226 Nevertheless, especially regarding enforcement 
measures that may include detention of the vessel or the imposition of fines, these 
considerations suggest that there is a need of caution, especially in cases of purely regional 
requirements, such as an HFO regulation applicable in the Arctic. As Ringbom notes, “the 
appropriateness of using detentions for enforcing compliance with regional requirements is 
not self-evident”.227 
However, as it is clear from the wording of the provision, Art. 218 LOSC does not 
allow for the enforcement of nationally prescribed rules that would go beyond GAIRS, 
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irrespective of what they regulate. As a result, every possible national legislation on HFO that 
goes beyond the Sulphur Oxides Regulation cannot be enforced by the port State if a violation 
occurs outside the territory of the State.  
A final note must be made regarding the port State jurisdiction regarding violations 
that took place out of the port of the State but on its territorial sea or EEZ. Port States can take 
enforcement action for violations of their national legislation in these waters in accordance 
with Art. 220 para. 1 LOSC. This enforcement jurisdiction depends on the legality of the 
prescribed measures that are adopted in the territorial sea and EEZ of the State.228 
Specifically, it allows for the institution of proceedings in respect of “any violation of its laws 
and regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention or applicable international rules 
and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels”. The term 
“applicable” that is used in this provision instead of the term “generally accepted”, appears to 
be in relation with the actors that are involved in the situation described in the provision.229 
Thus, the “applicability” of such rules is to be determined ad hoc. Nevertheless, ILA notes 
that the applicable rules would normally include GAIRS, since they potentially cover a 
broader set of rules that.230  The use of the word “or” means that the measures prescribed are 
not necessarily adopted in conformity with these applicable rules but could be in conformity 
only with the specific LOSC provisions. If an HFO regulation is indeed in accordance with 
the relevant LOSC provisions, the port State may enforce it when foreign-flagged vessels 
voluntarily call at its ports. This port-State jurisdiction is characterized by Molenaar as a 
“quasi-territorial jurisdiction”, since it provides for the extended jurisdiction of the State to 
violations that take place in maritime zones where it enjoys sovereignty or sovereign rights.231 
As the title of Art. 220 LOSC implies, these assertions are justified on the basis of this 
functional jurisdiction insofar as the port State also acts as a coastal State and has prescribed 
laws and regulations over the certain activities it has the capacity to do so within its territorial 
sea and EEZ.232 
Conclusively, the Arctic port States have many ways in their disposal to successfully 
regulate the use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic. It is apparent that the best option for an 
Arctic State to impose a regulation of HFO use and carriage is to prescribe it as an entry 
requirement for its ports. That way, it will be in position to go beyond the set GAIRS and 
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avoid the legal challenges that are laid down if it prescribes such a regulation only by virtue 
of its coastal State jurisdiction. Furthermore, such a regulation could affect the entire voyage 
of foreign-flagged vessels in a lawful way that would significantly decrease the use and 
carriage of HFO in the Arctic.  
However, due to the fact that a large number of vessels currently navigating the Arctic 
use HFO, the Arctic port States do not seem willing to impose such strict requirements for 
entry to their ports.  
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Part IV: Conclusions 
 This part offers the concluding remarks of the Thesis.  
This Thesis sought to examine four research questions: 1) What multilateral legal 
bases can Arctic States use in order to regulate the use and carriage of HFO? 2) What is the 
scope and limits of State jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce legislation on HFO use and 
carriage in the Arctic Ocean? Specifically, what are the limits for States that are willing to go 
beyond the generally accepted international rules and standards that are today in place? 3) Is it 
lawful for Arctic coastal States to unilaterally adopt and enforce regulations on the use and 
carriage of HFO in the waters under their jurisdiction? Specifically, are the regulations 
adopted by Iceland and Norway in accordance with international law? And finally, 4) what 
are the legal advantages and constraints that stem from multilateral and unilateral action for 
the regulation of HFO use and carriage in the Arctic Ocean?  
It is apparent that there is a complex international legal regime in place that can be 
utilized by States in order to regulate HFO use and carriage in the Arctic Ocean. This legal 
regime has the general LOSC provisions as its cornerstone, while MARPOL Annex I and 
Annex VI provide for more elaborate rules. However, this framework does not regulate HFO 
use and carriage in a way that is specifically tailored to this issue but, rather, it regulates 
related issues, such as the content of sulphur in the fuel. The Sulphur Oxides Regulation is 
today the most comprehensive tool to regulate HFO use and carriage. However, the fact that it 
focuses on emissions of sulphur means that other dangers posed by the use of HFO in the 
Arctic Ocean, such as the possibility of an oil spill, the emission of black carbon and other 
substances, remain significantly unregulated, apart from the general provisions found in 
LOSC and MARPOL. At the same time, the Polar Code only includes a non-mandatory 
recommendation for vessels to refrain from using HFO in the Arctic. As it is clear from the 
current negotiations that are currently undertaken in IMO, a comprehensive international legal 
framework specifically on HFO use and carriage in the Arctic Ocean will not be in place until 
2024, and for some vessels until 2029. Even then, the proposed ban will probably still leave 
great leeway for States and vessels to continue using HFO in the Arctic Ocean.  
 Consequently, States that are willing to regulate HFO use and carriage in a more 
comprehensive way are to rely on their own devices to do so. They are nevertheless limited 
by the international legal framework that seeks to strike a balance between the need to protect 
and preserve the marine environment and the navigational rights enjoyed by all States. In this 
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instant, flag States have the greatest capacity to regulate HFO use and carriage by the vessels 
flying their flags. However, to this day no flag State has undertaken such a task.  
Coastal States on the other hand can regulate HFO use and carriage in the waters 
under their jurisdiction but are significantly limited by the LOSC references to GAIRS. The 
territorial sea regime ties regulations that apply to CDEM of ships to GAIRS. As a result, it is 
easier for coastal States to regulate content of fuel or emission standards, where they can go 
beyond GAIRS, since no such prerequisite exists in the relevant LOSC provisions. 
Thus, Arctic coastal States are able to regulate HFO use and carriage as long as the 
uphold their obligations provided for in international law. Especially the States that can base 
their legislation on Art. 234 LOSC -mainly Canada and Russia- can utilize Art. 234 LOSC, 
which does not include a prerequisite to abide to GAIRS. However, neither of these States 
have expressed an intention to regulate HFO in the waters under their jurisdiction. Instead, 
both States have been reluctant to support the IMO work on the proposed HFO ban in the 
Arctic Ocean.  
Finally, port States are able to comprehensively regulate use and carriage of HFO by 
relying on their territorial jurisdiction and the fact that vessels voluntarily call at port, 
submitting themselves to the port State’s jurisdiction. Port States are able to effectively 
regulate activities that take place within their ports and internal waters, including static 
requirements that remain uniform throughout the ship’s voyage, including in areas that fall 
outside of the port State’s jurisdiction. Port States can thus prescribe regulations for vessels to 
not carry or use HFO while at port, a regulation that would have a permissible extraterritorial. 
Furthermore, the Arctic port States are in position to set entry conditions that could apply on 
the regulation of HFO, thus successfully and comprehensively regulate its use and carriage in 
the Arctic Ocean for all the ships that would wish to call at these ports.  
Hence, the Arctic States can indeed regulate the use and carriage of HFO acting as 
flag States, coastal States or port States. Each of these functional jurisdictions has its own 
limitations and potential, so it is up to the State to decide for the optimal way it is to regulate 
HFO use and carriage – if it wills to do so.  
Iceland’s and Norway’s legislation indeed focus on the regulation of HFO in waters 
under their jurisdiction. For Iceland, it applies to its ports, internal waters, territorial sea and 
EEZ, while for Norway on specific parts of its internal waters and territorial sea surrounding 
Svalbard. Whether the respective legislations of the two States are in accordance with the 
relevant LOSC and MARPOL provisions can be an issue of controversy. This author is of the 
opinion that both regulations are generally in accordance with international law of the sea, 
 
Page 48 of 59 
even if, in some cases, they go beyond GAIRS. The reason for this is the fact that they do not 
apply to the CDEM of foreign flagged vessels but rather they have an incidental effect on 
them that is to be regarded as lawful. However, Iceland and Norway have not set such 
regulations for the use and carriage of HFO as setting entry requirements for their ports. This 
can be seen as a drawback, since it limits their capacity to comprehensively regulate HFO use 
and carriage.  
 As it is clear from the research undertaken, a regulation of HFO use and carriage can 
be adequately facilitated by both a multilateral and a unilateral process. The international 
community has the capacity to regulate HFO use and carriage in a comprehensive way; it has 
done so with many other issues, including the regulation of the content of sulphur. In the 
same manner, concerned States can regulate HFO use and carriage by their vessels or in the 
waters under their jurisdiction, as long as they uphold their international obligations. What is 
evidently lacking today is the will to regulate this issue in a sufficient way to protect the 
fragile environment of the Arctic and the Arctic communities.   
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